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Introducing Disruptive Technology to
Criminal Sanctions
PUNISHMENT BY COMPUTER MONITORING TO
ENHANCE SENTENCING FAIRNESS AND
EFFICIENCY
Mirko Bagaric†, Dan Hunter††, and Colin Loberg†††
INTRODUCTION
The United States has the most punitive criminal justice
system on Earth. The total corrections population in the United
States is more than 6,613,000 people,1 consisting of approximately
3,673,100 offenders under probation,2 874,800 on parole3 and
2,162,400 undergoing incarceration in prisons and jails.4
Incredibly, this means about one in thirty-eight adults in the
United States is undergoing correctional supervision.5 Focusing
solely on parole and probation, it emerges that more offenders are
undergoing these sanctions than “live in half of all U.S. states.”6
“Approximately [one] in [fifty-five] adults in the United States were
under community supervision [i.e., parole or probation] at year-end
2016.”7 This is a staggering statistic. It is made all the more
remarkable because no meaningful community dividend has been
†
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1 DANIELLE KAEBLE & MARY COWHIG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 251211,
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2016, at 1 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/cpus16.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7ZZ-ZKES].
2 DANIELLE KAEBLE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 251148, PROBATION AND PAROLE
IN THE UNITED STATES, 2016, at 1 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S8HR-ZCYP] [hereinafter PROBATION AND PAROLE].
3 Id.
4 KAEBLE & COWHIG, supra note 1, at 2.
5 Id. at 4.
6 Larry Krasner & Miriam Krinsky, Larry Krasner: Time to Rethink Probation
and Parole, INQUIRER DAILY NEWS PHILLY.COM (May 25, 2018), http://www.philly.com/
philly/opinion/commentary/larry-krasner-probation-parole-community-correctionscriminal-justice-philadelphia-20180525.html [https://perma.cc/C39J-REHX].
7 PROBATION AND PAROLE, supra note 2, at 1.
††
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derived from this unprecedented restraint on human liberty. In
particular, America is not safer.8 The only tangible effects of the
massive increase in correctional numbers over the past four
decades are the mountainous financial burdens on the taxpayer
and the severe fragmentation of millions of family units.9
The focus of this article is to propose technological sanctions
that can replace all forms of community supervision sanctions.10
These come in two main forms. Probation is a court-imposed order
mandating correctional supervision in the community and is
normally imposed as an alternative to incarceration.11 Parole is a
post-incarceration order that is normally made by a parole board
and involves releasing the offender into the community.12 Thus,
probation is a front-end sanction, which is used instead of prison,
while parole is a back-end sanction, which is invoked after an
offender has served part of his or her prison term. Offenders who
are placed on probation or released on parole are normally
subjected to a number of restrictions.13
The conditions that are imposed as part of probation and
parole are generally quite similar. The most important condition is
not to commit any further offenses.14 Other requirements typically
include geographical restrictions (for example, constraints on where
an offender can reside and travel) and behavioral restrictions,
including a prohibition against offending and consuming drugs and
alcohol.15 A corrections officer non-pervasively monitors these
orders.16 Generally, it consists of pre-organized meetings with staff.17
The key problem with monitoring offenders on probation
and parole is that the supervision is only intermittent and hence
there is ample opportunity for offenders to violate the conditions
of their orders. Not surprisingly, reoffending rates are high18—the
average failure of rate of parole is approximately twenty-eight
percent.19 Moreover, studies show that placing offenders on parole
after release from prison does not reduce the rate at which they

8
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14
15
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17
18
19

See infra INTRODUCTION.
Id.
This does not include prison.
PROBATION AND PAROLE, supra note 2, at 2.
See infra INTRODUCTION.
See infra INTRODUCTION.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
Krasner & Krinsky, supra note 6.
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are rearrested.20 Another problem with these sanctions are their
expense. It costs between $1,000 to over $4,000 annually to
monitor each offender who is on probation or parole.21
The need for new forms of sanctions has been highlighted
by a recent report which notes fundamental failings of probation
and parole systems. Systemic problems with the systems relate to
a lack of appropriate resourcing, leading to offenders being sent
to prison for technical violations, such as missing curfews or
socializing with forbidden associates. Thus, it has been claimed
that “the parole and probation systems have become . . . a
significant driver of recidivism.”22
Moreover, it has been observed that while in recent years
most of the focus in criminal justice reform in the United States
has been on the mass incarceration problem, the massive increase
in probation and parole numbers has gone largely unnoticed. It is
an under-researched area of law and the sanctions are not
properly designed to meet their objectives. To this end, a recent
report by the Columbia University Justice Lab notes:
Originally designed as alternatives to incarceration, the authors find
that probation and parole are a deprivation of liberty in their own right
and have become key drivers of mass incarceration by serving as a trip
wire to reincarceration for many of those under supervision. The
authors argue that community corrections populations have risen
alongside prison and jail populations but that community corrections
has not been funded adequately to meet the needs of a population of
individuals beset by poverty, unemployment, inadequate housing,
mental illness and substance use.23

In August 2017, more than forty community corrections
executives and many other individuals and organizations
working in the criminal justice industry across the United States
noted that parole and probation are ineffective sanctions, which
too often become significant contributors to “mass incarceration
with nearly as many people entering prison for violations of
20 Carl Reynolds et al., Justice Reinvestment in Pennsylvania, CSG JUST. CTR.
(Sept. 2016), https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/JR-in-Pennsylvania_
Fourth-Presentation.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZUH-H2RR].
21 See infra Sections III.B, III.C.
22 The Editorial Board, The Problem with Parole, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/11/opinion/problem-parole.html [https://perma.cc/7G38APQQ]; see also Vincent Schiraldi & Jennifer Arzu, Less is More in New York: An
Examination of the Impact of State Parole Violations on Prison and Jail Populations,
COLUM. U. JUST. LAB 1 (Jan. 29, 2018), http://justicelab.iserp.columbia.edu/img/Less_is_
More_in_New_York_Report_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BQW-Y3Q8].
23 Too Big to Succeed: The Impact of the Growth of Community Corrections
and What Should Be Done About It, COLUM. U. JUST. LAB 1 (Jan. 29, 2018), https://
justicelab.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/Too_Big_to_Succeed_Report_FINA
L.pdf [https://perma.cc/MTP8-G7U3].
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community corrections conditions as for new offenses.”24 The
group advocated that more resources should be directed towards
rehabilitative measures, as opposed to continuing with the
current parole and probation process.25
Thus, there is a widespread recognition that the parole
and probation systems have failed and require fundamental
reform. Technology can facilitate all aspects of probation and
parole far more effectively and efficiently than is currently the
case. Motion sensors and surveillance tracking devices, which are
already in use in the health sector (for example, to detect when
people have falls) and in driverless cars can be adapted to record
every movement of an offender.26 This technology would not only
greatly improve compliance with the conditions of community
service orders, but it would also provide evidential data if
offenders did reoffend, thereby saving considerable police and
prosecution costs.
In this article, we propose a solution to deal with the main
inadequacies associated with common forms of criminal sanctions
in the nature of parole and probation. The key aspect of the
solution involves resorting to an area of learning that is almost
foreign to the criminal justice system, but commonplace in all
other areas of society: new technological systems. Sentencing is
the area of human society which has been least impacted by
developments in science and technology.27 The main manner in
which we punish offenders has effectively remained unchanged
for centuries. The mainstay of criminal punishment remains
imprisonment, which involves confining offenders behind high
concrete walls, as we have done for centuries. The most common
sanction for less serious offenders in the United States is
probation.28 The United States Sentencing Commission has
recognized the need for new criminal sanctions.29

24 Statement on the Future of Community Corrections, COLUM. U. JUST. LAB (Aug. 28,
2017), http://justicelab.iserp.columbia.edu/statement.html [https://perma.cc/QL9L-RTN7].
25 See Krasner & Krinsky, supra note 6.
26 See infra Part IV.
27 Mirko Bagaric et al., Technological Incarceration and the End of the Prison
Crisis, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 73, 77 (2018).
28 See infra Part I.
29 See
generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL ALTERNATIVE-TOINCARCERATION COURT PROGRAMS (Sept. 2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
research-and-publications/researchpublications/2017/20170928_alternatives.pdf [https://perma
.cc/BPV4-NCX4]. This is especially in relation to first offenders. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO SENTENCING GUIDELINES 1 (2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/
default/files/pdf/amendment-process/reader-friendly-amendments/20161219_rf_proposed.pdf
[https://perma.cc/893A-58FD].
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The reason for the gulf between technology and criminal
justice, and in particular criminal sanctions, is unclear.30
Irrespective of the explanation for this, we argue there is a need
for a fusion between the two areas of learning and societal
practice. This article recommends a new type of sanction (which
we term the “monitoring sanction”) which can fundamentally
alter and disrupt the nature of criminal sanctions. The aim is to
develop economically affordable sanctions which punish offenders
proportionately for their crimes, while limiting their capacity to
reoffend during the period of the sanction. The fulcrum, around
which the new sanction would be based, is the technological realtime monitoring of all the offenders’ actions.
In previous writings, we have recommended that most
prisons terms should be replaced with a new sanction, which in
essence consists of technological incarceration.31 The solution
proposed in this article builds on this proposal and expands it
to include the full range of criminal sanctions that are imposed
for serious offenses.32 Part I of the article provides an overview
of the crisis that currently exists in the criminal justice system,
in the form of the overly punitive nature of criminal sanctions.
We also outline the current momentum for wide-ranging
reform. Part II examines the appropriate objectives of
sentencing as a backdrop to the aims of the sanctions that we
propose in the article. Part III provides an overview of the
manner in which parole and probation are currently
implemented in the United States. In Part IV, we detail the
manner in which the new monitoring sanction would be
developed and implemented. Possible criticisms of the
monitoring sanction are dealt with in Part V. Our
recommendations are summarized in our concluding remarks.

Some explanations are offered in Bagaric et al., supra note 27, at 77, 98–102.
Id. at 73, 77–78.
32 The new sanctions we propose can also replace most fines that are issued by
the courts. However, the priority is on substitutes to incarceration, parole and probation,
given that incarceration alone comprises about 70% of all criminal sanctions. See Danielle
Allen, How Should We Deal with Wrongdoing? And You Can’t Say ‘Prison,’ WASH. POST
(May 16, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-should-we-deal-withwrongdoing-and-you-cant-say-prison/2018/05/16/315751fe-5934-11e8-8836-a4a123c359ab
_story.html [https://perma.cc/7HAA-GSVS].
30
31
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The Over-Punitive Criminal Justice System
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More Americans are undergoing correctional sanctions
than in any other country in the world.33 Currently, there are more
than 2.1 million Americans in prisons or local jails.34 This rate has
been steadily increasing over the past forty years,35 and has more
than doubled over the past two decades.36 In recent years,
incarceration levels have been declining but, as discussed further
below, the decrease is very minor.37 The imprisonment rate is 660
per one hundred thousand U.S. residents or, viewed slightly
differently, 860 per one hundred thousand U.S. residents ages 18
or older.38 The scale of this is illustrated by the fact that the United
States is the world’s biggest incarcerator. Its imprisonment rate is
approximately ten times that of certain Scandinavian countries,
including Sweden and Finland.39 Prison rates in the United States
are, however, far from uniform. Some states, such as Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota and Vermont, have imprisonment
numbers around three hundred per one hundred thousand adult
residents.40 Others, however, are staggeringly high. Oklahoma and
Louisiana have 1,079 and 1,052 prisoners per one hundred
thousand adult residents respectively.41
The price of incarcerating so many offenders in United
States’ prisons is more than $1 trillion each year—almost six
33 MELISSA S. KEARNEY ET AL., THE HAMILTON PROJECT, BROOKINGS INST., TEN
ECONOMIC FACTS ABOUT CRIME AND INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (2014), http://
www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/legacy/files/downloads_and_links/v8_THP_10CrimeFacts.
pdf [https://perma.cc/8DR2-P46S].
34 DANIELLE KAEBLE & LAUREN GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 250374,
CORRECTIONAL POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2015, at 1 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/cpus15.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LPV-AS7J].
35 In fact, during this period it has quadrupled. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES 34 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014).
36 Albert R. Hunt, A Country of Inmates, N.Y. Tbos (Nov. 20, 2011), http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/us/21iht-letter21.html [https://perma.cc/L45S-FAFC].
37 See infra Part I.
38 KAEBLE & GLAZE, supra note 34, at 12.
39 KEARNEY ET AL., supra note 33, at 10. Incarceration rates in Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries range from forty-seven
to 266 per 100,000 residents. John Pfaff and James Forman argue that the key reason
for the increase in incarceration numbers is stricter prosecution practices, where felonies
were charged at a higher rate and in larger numbers. See, e.g., JAMES FORMAN JR.,
LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 129 (1st ed. 2017);
JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW TO
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017).
40 Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, States of Incarceration: The Global Context
2018, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (June 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2018.html
[https://perma.cc/VWR3-RNVN].
41 Id.
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percent of America’s Gross Domestic Product42 (this figure
includes the raw monetary cost of prisons, which is around $80
billion each year,43 plus the indirect social costs incurred through
mass incarceration). As these costs are met by government,
expenditure on incarceration necessarily depletes the funds
available for other social services.44 Indeed, currently in some
states, governments spend more on prisons than on higher
education.45 According to the National Research Council

42 Michael McLaughlin et al., The Economic Burden of Incarceration in the U.S. 4
(Fla. State Univ. Inst. for Justice Research & Innovation, Working Paper No. IJRD07, 2016,),
https://ijrd.csw.fsu.edu/sites/g/files/upcbnu1766/files/media/images/publication_pdfs/
Economic_Burden_of_Incarceration_IJRD072016_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9F38-4QWZ]. The
direct costs of the criminal justice system are $270 billion annually. LAUREN-BROOKE “L.B.”
EISEN & INIMAI M. CHETTIAR, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE: AN ELECTION
AGENDA FOR CANDIDATES, ACTIVISTS, AND LEGISLATORS 1 (2018), https://www.brennan
center.org/sites/default/files/publications/2018_05_Agendas_CriminalJustice_pdf.pdf [https://
perma.cc/RF5Y-JWXR].
43 Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform,
130 HARV. L. Ro/. 811, 818 (2017).
44 For an analysis of why mass incarceration is flawed from a financial
perspective, see Jason Furman & Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Why Mass Incarceration Doesn’t
Pay, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/21/opinion/why-massincarceration-doesnt-pay.html [https://perma.cc/4764-FWRC].
45 See Adam Gopnik, The Caging of America, NEW YORKER (Jan. 22, 2012),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/01/30/the-caging-of-america
[https://perma.cc/8QZZ-TWYG]. Reduced investment in education is also occurring at the
more junior education level:

In recent . . . years states have cut education funding, in some cases by large
amounts. At least [thirty] states are providing less general funding per student
this year for K-12 schools than in state fiscal year 2008, before the Great
Recession hit, after adjusting for inflation. In [fourteen] states, the reduction
exceeds [ten] percent. The three states with the deepest funding cuts since the
recession hit—Alabama, Arizona, and Oklahoma—are among the ten states
with the highest incarceration rates.
Michael Mitchell & Michael Leachman, Changing Priorities: State Criminal Justice Reforms
and Investments in Education, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 10 (Oct. 28, 2014), https://
www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/10-28-14sfp.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3RK-UC6P];
see also Beatrice Gitau, The Hidden Costs of Funding Prisons Instead of Schools, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, (Oct. 3, 2015), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2015/1003/The-hiddencosts-of-funding-prisons-instead-of-schools [https://perma.cc/FWK2-RE5R] (noting that
eleven states spend more on prisons than universities: “Michigan, Oregon, Arizona, Vermont,
Colorado, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Delaware, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and
Connecticut”). More recently, it has been documented that
In the past [thirty] years, we’ve seen a shift in the way we allocate resources—
spending on education has grown painfully slowly, compared to spending on
incarceration. Between 1980 and 2013, education budgets grew by [fifty-eight]
percent in West Virginia, [sixty-nine] percent in Oklahoma, and 102 percent in
Kentucky; during that time there was an explosive growth of spending on
incarceration with an increase of 483 percent in West Virginia, 341 percent in
Oklahoma and 259 percent in Kentucky. Other states showed similar patterns
during those years: Colorado saw a growth of 103 percent for education but 513
percent for corrections; Arizona spent 188 percent more for education but 491
percent more for corrections.
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spending by many states on corrections has outpaced
government spending on nearly all of other types of services.46
Shouldering the financial burden of the criminal justice
system has become increasingly difficult. As former President
Barack Obama remarked, “We simply cannot afford to spend $80
billion annually on incarceration.”47 This massive sum has become
ever more politically indefensible as the expense has failed to result
in any tangible benefits to the community, and in particular, there
has not been a demonstrated increase in public safety. Upon
reviewing the effects that increased “tough on crime” measures
have on crime rates, David Roodman surmised, “my best estimate
is that the best estimate of the impact of additional incarceration
on crime in the United States today is zero. And, while that
estimate is not certain, there is as much reason overall to believe
that incarceration increases crime as decreases it.”48 In his
comprehensive September 2017 study, Roodman lists two crucial
reasons why he believes that increasing imprisonment rates do not
reduce the number of crimes committed:
[P]utting more people in prison may cause more crime in
prison . . . . [I]ncarceration may be more criminogenic than rehabilitative.
Having been imprisoned may make it harder for people to find legal
employment, may psychologically alienate them from society, or may
strengthen their social bonds with criminals, all of which could raise
recidivism.49

While the focus of over-punishment in the United States
has been on the growth in prison numbers, the sanctions where the
“tough on crime” approach has manifested most extensively are
probation and parole. A recent report by the Columbia University
Justice Lab notes that while probation and parole have dropped
slightly (by ten percent) from 2007 to 2015, in relative terms (as
measured by the ratio of arrests to the imposition of parole or
probation) the use of such sanctions has in fact increased to the
point where one out of fifty-three American adults in 2015 was on
parole or probation.50

Marc Schindler, Taxing Our Kids to Fund Prisons, HILL (May 2, 2018), http://thehill.com/
opinion/education/385520-taxing-our-kids-to-fund-prisons [https://perma.cc/B89M-3GAY].
46 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 35, at 314–19; see also KEARNEY ET
AL., supra note 33, at 13.
47 Obama, supra note 43, at 815.
48 DAVID
ROODMAN, OPEN PHILANTHROPY PROJECT, THE IMPACTS OF
INCARCERATION ON CRIME 7 (2017), https://www.openphilanthropy.org/files/Focus_Areas/
Criminal_Justice_Reform/The_impacts_of_incarceration_on_crime_10.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2N9S-Y7BX].
49 Id.
50 Too big to Succeed, supra note 23, at 2.
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As noted by the above report, the number of adults under
probation or parole has reduced by approximately ten percent
since 2007 but the total number of adults under probation or
parole remains remarkably high—more than four million
people51—and hence, there is a strong need to reflect upon and
review the efficiency and efficacy of the sanctions.
B.

The Causes of Over-Punishment in the United States

Prior to examining the current momentum for sentencing
reform in the United States, this article provides an overview of
the causes of the harsh sentencing approach that currently
exists in America. The move from the 1970s approach of
discretionary sentencing to one with harsh fixed or presumptive
sanctions is the largest contributor to the current high
correctional population. Before this shift, American sentencing
courts had considerable discretion in setting penalties.52 Judge
Nancy Gertner observed the expanse of the courts’ decisionmaking freedom at that time:
Consistent with this view of judges as the sentencing experts,
Congress took a back seat, prescribing a broad range of punishments
for each offense, and intervening only occasionally to increase the
maximum penalty for specific crimes in response to public demand.
Judges had substantial discretion to sentence, so long as it was within
the statutory range. In effect, the breadth of the sentencing range left
to the courts the task of “distinguishing between more or less serious
crimes within the same category.”53

The arguments voiced by those opposed to “indeterminate
sentencing,” as Gertner described it, focused on its supposed
opaqueness, inconsistency, and unreliability, which Gertner stated
could be attributed to the following fundamental flaw:
Id.
Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too
Much Law, or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 695–97 (2010). As noted by
William W. Berry III, Prior to 1984, federal judges possessed discretion that was virtually
“unfettered” in determining sentences, guided only by broad sentence ranges provided by
federal criminal statutes. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the “Act”) moved the sentencing
regime almost completely to the other extreme, implementing a system of mandatory
guidelines that severely limited the discretion of the sentencing judge. William W. Berry III,
Discretion Without Guidance: The Need to Give Meaning to § 3553 After Booker and Its
Progeny, 40 CONN. L. REV. 631, 633 (2008) (emphasis added). They are also one of the key
distinguishing aspects of the United States sentencing system compared to many other
countries. See CONNIE DE LA VEGA ET AL., UNIV. S.F. SCH. OF LAW CTR. FOR LAW & GLOBAL
JUSTICE, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: U.S. SENTENCING PRACTICES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 46–47
(2012), https://www.usfca.edu/sites/default/files/law/cruel-and-unusual.pdf [https://perma.cc/
KN82-P2AN] (noting that 137 of 168 surveyed countries had some form of minimum
penalties, but none of the others were as wide ranging or severe as in the United States).
53 Gertner, supra note 52, at 696.
51
52
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[J]udges had no training in how to exercise their considerable discretion.
Whatever the criminological literature, judges did not know about it.
Sentencing was not taught in law schools; and to the extent there was
any debate about deterrence and rehabilitation . . . it was not reflected in
judicial training. It was as if judges were functioning as diagnosticians
without authoritative texts, surgeons without Gray’s Anatomy.54

In 1973, Judge Marvin Frankel, in an influential
commentary, asserted that this indeterminate system was
“lawless.”55 The push for prescriptive penalties dovetailed with the
“tough on crime” political agenda, which was a response to increases
in the crime rate and skepticism about the capacity of the criminal
justice system to rehabilitate offenders.56
The move toward guideline or mandatory sentencing
grew quickly and today all U.S. jurisdictions to some degree have
penalties of this nature.57 Nineteen U.S. jurisdictions have
extensive guideline sentencing systems.58 These guidelines
assign fixed or presumptive penalties,59 with the two main
determinants of penalty severity being the seriousness of the
offense and the prior criminal history of the offender.60 The main
sentencing objective that underpinned these sentencing regimes
was community protection.61

Id. at 696–97.
MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 8 (1973).
For a critique of his impact, see Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Marvin Frankel’s
Mistakes and the Need to Rethink Federal Sentencing, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 239, 242,
245–54 (2008).
56 See KIDEUK KIM & BRYCE PETERSON, URBAN INST., AGING BEHIND BARS:
TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS OF GRAYING PRISONERS IN THE FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM 6
(2014), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/413222-AgingBehind-Bars-Trends-and-Implications-of-Graying-Prisoners-in-the-Federal-PrisonSystem.PDF [https://perma.cc/FF6R-Q468].
57 Mandatory or guideline sentences are also one of the key distinguishing
aspects of the United States sentencing system compared to that of Australia’s (and most
other sentencing systems in the world). See CONNIE DE LA VEGA ET AL., supra note 52, at
42–45; Michael Tonry, Remodeling American Sentencing: A Ten-Step Blueprint for
Moving Past Mass Incarceration, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 503, 517 (2014); see also
Kevin R. Reitz, introduction to AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM IN CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
22–24 (Kevin R. Reitz ed., 2018).
58 These jurisdictions include Alabama, Kansas, Oregon, Maryland, Pennsylvania,
Arkansas, Massachusetts, Tennessee, Delaware, Michigan, Utah, District of Columbia,
Minnesota, Virginia, Federal (US courts), North Carolina, Washington, Florida and Ohio. See
Richard S. Frase & Kelly Lyn Mitchell, What Are Sentencing Guidelines?, U. MINN. ROBINA
INST. CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. (Mar. 21, 2018), http://sentencing.umn.edu/content/what-aresentencing-guidelines [https://perma.cc/8ELF-7M5Q].
59 For the purposes of clarity, these forms of penalties both come under the
terminology of fixed or standard penalties in this article.
60 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 35, at 325.
61 See id. at 9. The states’ and federal government’s other sentencing objectives
are general deterrence, specific deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.1 pt. A (U.S SENTENCING COMM’N 2016) [hereinafter
GUIDELINES MANUAL]. For an overview of the flaws with the Federal Guideline system, see
54

55
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As William W. Berry III notes, guideline sentencing systems
have greatly diminished judicial discretion in sentencing:
Prior to 1984, federal judges possessed discretion that was virtually
“unfettered” in determining sentences, guided only by broad sentence
ranges provided by federal criminal statutes. The Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984 . . . moved the sentencing regime almost completely to the other
extreme, implementing a system of mandatory guidelines that severely
limited the discretion of the sentencing judge.62

Numerous studies have shown that the introduction of sentencing
guidelines has led to a substantial increase in prison numbers and
an increase in the length of prison terms for many offenses.63 In
2012, the Pew Center reported that since 1990, the average length
of prison terms had increased by thirty-six percent.64 In 2013, more
than ten percent of American prisoners were serving life sentences.65
This is a four-fold increase from 1984, despite the decline in the
crime rate since this time.66 This is in keeping with the observations
of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, which notes: “the average
sentence length for offenders who were convicted of an offense
carrying a mandatory minimum penalty was 110 months of
imprisonment, nearly four times the average sentence (28 months)
for offenders not convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory
minimum penalty.”67
It is important to emphasize that the increased penalties did
not simply lead to more offenders in prison. Increasing numbers of
generally Jon O. Newman, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Good Idea Badly
Implemented, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 805 (2018).
62 Berry III, supra note 52, at 633; see also Lynn Adelman, How Congress, the
U.S. Sentencing Commission, and Federal Judges Contribute to Mass Incarceration,
LITIGATION, Fall 2017, at 1, 1–2.
63 Mitchell & Leachman, supra note 45, at 2–6; see also More Prison, Less
Probation for Federal Offenders, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Jan. 12, 2016),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2016/01/more-prisonless-probation-for-federal-offenders [https://perma.cc/B2YR-9DF4]. Most recently, see
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES FOR DRUG OFFENSES IN
THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 4, 6 (2017), where it is noted that “[m]andatory
minimum penalties continued to have a significant impact on the size and composition
of the federal prison population” and “[d]rug mandatory minimum penalties applied
more broadly than Congress may have anticipated.”
64 THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., TIME SERVED:
THE HIGH COST, LOW RETURN OF LONGER PRISON TERMS 2 (June 2012), http://www.
pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/sentencing_and_
corrections/prisontimeservedpdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2HD-WZAS].
65 ASHLEY NELLIS, SENTENCING PROJECT LIFE GOES ON: THE HISTORIC RISE IN
LIFE SENTENCES IN AMERICA 1 (2013), http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/12/Life-Goes-On.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y38H-FCLG].
66 Id.
67 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 6 (2017), https://
www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/
2017/20170711_Mand-Min.pdf [https://perma.cc/WWJ7-9WLV].
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prisoners resulted in more offenders on parole (at the tail of their
prison term) and also more offenders being placed on probation.
Further, the “tough on crime” approach resulted in increasingly
stringent conditions being imposed as part of parole and probation.
To this end, the Report by the Columbia Justice Lab notes:
Probation and parole were swept up in the explosive national growth of
imprisonment, the passage of mandatory sentencing and “three strikes”
laws, and the increase in sentence lengths. As Corbett describes, “. . . no
probation administrator could afford to ignore the shifting political winds.
Accordingly, probation departments around the country raced to take on
the look and feel and accoutrements of a ‘get tough’ agency.” These
accoutrements included increasing numbers of conditions of community
supervision, which are estimated at between [ten] to [twenty] conditions
per person. These can range from fines, fees and restitution; to
requirements to abstain from drugs and alcohol; to prohibitions from
moving or associating with others with criminal convictions; to work and
community service requirements. Violations can result in further
restrictions, up to and including incarceration.68

Thus, we see that over the past forty years in the United
States there has been a striking increase in the severity of
criminal sanctions. This change resulted in a marked increase
in prison numbers and also a significant increase in the number
of offenders on parole and probation.
C.

Recognition of Need for Reform

The “tough on crime” approach that has been a mainstay of
American politics and society more generally for much of the past
forty years is no longer receiving unquestioned support. Individuals
and a diverse range of institutions and groups are advocating for a
softening of sanctions imposed for many types of offenses.
These views are no longer fringe but have been echoed
among top government officials and politicians. Eric Holder,
President Obama’s first Attorney General (and the first AfricanAmerican AG)69 stated in 2013 that “too many Americans go to too
many prisons for far too long, and for no truly good law enforcement
reason. It’s clear, at a basic level, that [twentieth]-century criminal
justice solutions are not adequate to overcome our [twenty-first]century challenges.”70 After his time in office, Holder argued in The
Too big to succeed, supra note 23, at 5 (citations omitted).
See Carrie Johnson, Holder Confirmed as Nation’s First Black Attorney
General, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/
02/AR2009020202581.html [https://perma.cc/A296-L3VG].
70 Eric Holder, Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the Annual
Meeting of the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.
justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-speech-130812.html [https://perma.cc/AC3K-8JCX].
68

69
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New York Times that the United States can reduce prison numbers
without compromising community security.71
Many recent surveys reveal strong public support for
sentencing reform. An American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
survey conducted in late 2017 shows that seventy-one percent of
respondents believe that the United States should reduce prison
numbers. This was a bipartisan call for action, with “[e]ighty-seven
percent of Democrats, [sixty-seven] percent of independents, and
[fifty-seven] percent of Republicans” agreeing that America should
reduce prison numbers.72 The ACLU poll also showed that “[t]wo in
three Americans would be more likely to vote for candidates who
supported reducing the prison population and using the savings to
reinvest in drug treatment and mental health programs, including
[sixty-five] percent of Trump voters.”73
A more wide-ranging poll shows that three-quarters of
Americans believe that the criminal justice system needs to be
significantly improved, and eighty-seven percent of Americans
agree that community money directed to imprisoning nonviolent offenders should be shifted to alternatives such as
electronic monitoring. Further, eighty-five percent of voters
believe that the main objective of sentencing should be
rehabilitation.74 In a recent poll of supporters of President
Trump, sixty-three percent of respondents agreed that judges
should have more capacity to impose sanctions other than
imprisonment.75 More widely it has been reported that:
71 Eric H. Holder Jr., Eric Holder: We Can Have Shorter Sentences and Less Crime,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/14/opinion/sunday/eric-h-hold
er-mandatory-minimum-sentences-full-of-errors.html [https://perma.cc/8XK6-BU3Z].
72 Udi Ofer, ACLU Poll Finds Americans Reject Trump’s Tough-on-Crime
Approach, ACLU (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/blog/mass-incarceration/smartjustice/aclu-poll-finds-americans-reject-trumps-tough-crime-approach [https://perma.cc/
7AWE-CJV4].
73 Id.; see also Reason-Rupe Public Opinion Survey: October 2014 Topline
Results, REASON.COM 4 (Oct. 9, 2014), http://reason.com/assets/db/14128084586864.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9NQE-VYT7]. In one survey, even most victims of crime supported
sentencing reforms which would lower prison numbers. See Timothy Williams, Trump
Wants to Get Tough on Crime. Victims Don’t Agree., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/11/us/crime-victims-poll-trump-agenda.html
[https://perma.cc/KL5K-7UZY].
74 Lydia Wheeler, Poll: ¾ of Americans Support Criminal Justice Reform, HILL (Jan.
25, 2018), http://thehill.com/regulation/370692-poll-3-4-of-americans-support-criminal-justicereform [https://perma.cc/55E2-3FBE]. This increased acceptance of rehabilitation represents a
vast change in polls over recent decades which traditionally showed that the vast majority of
Americans were in favor of tougher sentences. See Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, Jeff Sessions Is
Trying to Take Criminal Justice Back to the 1990s, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Feb. 7, 2018),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/jeff-sessions-is-trying-to-take-criminal-justice-back-to-the1990s [https://perma.cc/8D94-8LWR].
75 Vikrant P. Reddy, The Conservative Base Wants Criminal-Justice Reform,
NAT’L REV. (May 8, 2017), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/447398/criminaljustice-reform-donald-trump-supporters-conservative-base-want-fresh
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Crime is no longer a wedge issue, and voters desire reform. A 2017
poll from the Charles Koch Institute reveals that [eighty-one] percent
of Trump voters consider criminal justice reform important. Another,
from Republican pollster Robert Blizzard, finds that [eighty-seven]
percent of Americans agree that nonviolent offenders should be
sanctioned with alternatives to incarceration. And according to a 2017
ACLU poll, [seventy-one] percent of Americans support reducing the
prison population — including [fifty] percent of Trump voters.76

Notably, criminal justice reform is one of the few issues that has
wide-ranging support: “criminal justice reform presents an
issue—perhaps the only issue today—on which the left and the
right can unite”77 to reduce incarceration numbers and eliminate
problems such as “ruthless mandatory penalties.”78
In October 2017, Law Enforcement Leaders to Reduce
Crime and Incarceration, an alliance of more than two hundred law
enforcement officials, including police chiefs and attorneys general
from all fifty states, agreed that reducing the incarceration rate
could be done without leading to an increase in the crime rate. The
group submitted an open letter to President Trump urging his
White House to pivot from its stated “tough on crime” approach
because the organization does not “believe that public safety is
served by a return to tactics that punish without strong purpose.”79
Since taking office, President Trump initially continued
his harsh stance on criminal law adopted during his campaign
and personally endorsed a “tough on crime” agenda.80 The
[https://perma.cc/FK3F-N3TY]; see also Jasmine Heiss & Jack Norton, United Toward
Justice: Urban and Rural Communities Share Concerns About Incarceration, Fairness of
the Justice System, and Public Spending Priorities, VERA INST., JUST. (Apr. 19, 2018),
https://www.vera.org/blog/united-toward-justice-urban-and-rural-communities-shareconcerns-about-incarceration-fairness-of-the-justice-system-and-public-spendingpriorities [https://perma.cc/UX97-2KQU] (discussing polling that exhibits united support
for criminal justice reform from American citizens).
76 EISEN & CHETTIAR, supra note 42, at 1.
77 Erik Luna, Is It Time for Criminologists to Step Outside the Ivory Tower?, CRIME
REP. (Nov. 7, 2017) (emphasis in original), https://thecrimereport.org/2017/11/07/is-it-timefor-criminologists-to-step-outside-the-ivory-tower [https://perma.cc/85T3-UHK6].
78 Id.
79 Press Release, Law Enf’t Leaders, Police and Prosecutors Urge Trump and
Sessions to Join Bipartisan Movement for Criminal Justice Reform, (Oct. 18, 2017),
http://lawenforcementleaders.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Crime-Summit-PressRelease.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q84V-LW27]; see also Douglas A. Berman, Notable New Group
Advocating for Sentencing Reforms: Law Enforcement Leaders to Reduce Crime and
Incarceration, SENT’G L. & POL’Y (Oct. 21, 2015), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_
law_and_policy/2015/10/notable-new-group-advocating-for-sentencing-reforms-law-enforce
ment-leaders-to-reduce-crime-and-inca.html [https://perma.cc/LED4-ZH8U]; Press Release,
Law Enf’t Leaders, 60+ Top Law Enforcement to Congress: White House Criminal Justice
Efforts Not Sufficient to Reduce Crime (Apr. 23, 2018), http://lawenforcementleaders.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/04/LEL-April-2018-SRCA-Letter-Press-Release.pdf.
80 See Jenna Goff & Joan Greve, Trump vs. Clinton: Criminal Justice Reform,
PBS: WASH. WK. (Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/weta/washingtonweek/blog-post/
trump-vs-clinton-criminal-justice-reform [https://perma.cc/67UN-D7AS]; Michelle Mark,
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Brennan Center for Justice analyzed developments in criminal
justice in the first year of the Trump presidency and argues that
during this period a harsher criminal justice system has evolved:
All told, President Trump and Attorney General Jeff Sessions have
already left a significant mark on the Justice Department. They have
used short memoranda or subtle changes in enforcement strategy to
quietly undo much of President Barack Obama’s criminal justice
reform legacy. In its place, they have built a more draconian vision of
law enforcement, centered around immigration.81

There is now, however, a growing number of influential
Republican politicians agitating for softer sentences.82 The
Trump administration has enacted legislation that aims to lower
the federal prison number.83 This sentiment has translated into
meaningful legislative change with the passing of the FIRST
STEP Act, which received overwhelming support from the
Democrats and Republicans in Congress84 in December 2018.
The Act was praised by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights,
which noted that:
The Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act contains necessary and
important steps towards more equitable punishments in the federal
system, advancing the fair administration of justice by better fitting
punishment to crime. If enacted, it would help reduce the outsize US
prison population without jeopardizing public safety.85

Here’s What Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump Think About Criminal Justice, BEs. Ibsso6
AEsG°. (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.businessinsider.com.au/trump-and-clinton-on-issuesmass-incarceration-and-criminal-justice-2016-9 [https://perma.cc/C83V-97JH].
81 AMES GRAWERT & JAMES CULLEN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE ONE YEAR INTO THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 1 (2018), https://www.brennan
center.org/sites/default/files/publications/Criminal_Justice_One_Year_Into_the_Trump_
Administration_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/XZE7-H3P6]; see also Justin George, Trump Justice,
Year One: The Demolition Derby, MARSHALL PROJECT (Jan. 17, 2018), https://
www.themarshallproject.org/2018/01/17/trump-justice-year-one-the-demolition-derby
[https://perma.cc/MQ83-LSQG].
82 Amanda Marcotte, Can Republicans Get Sentencing Reform Past Trump and
His Base?, Sy°_b (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.salon.com/2017/10/12/can-republicans-getsentencing-reform-past-trump-and-his-base [https://perma.cc/EDB4-RC58].
83 Alexander Bolton, Trump Gives Thumbs Up to Prison Sentencing Reform Bill at
Pivotal Meeting, HILL (Aug. 3, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/400176trump-gives-thumbs-up-to-prison-sentencing-reform-bill-at-pivotal-meeting.
84 Ames Grawert & Tim Lau, How the FIRST STEP Act Became Law — and What
Happens Next, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/
blog/how-first-step-act-became-law-and-what-happens-next.
85 Press Release, U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
Supports Sentencing Reform Legislation (Nov. 13, 2017), http://www.usccr.gov/press/
2017/11-13-statement.pdf; see also Chuck Grassley, Sen. Chuck Grassley: Sentencing
Reform Bill Will Fight Crime, FOX NEWS (Apr. 27, 2018), http://www.foxnews.com/
opinion/2018/04/27/sen-chuck-grassley-sentencing-reform-bill-will-fight-crime.html. For
an analysis of the likely impact of the Act, see U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SENTENCE AND
PRISON IMPACT ESTIMATE SUMMARY S. 1917, THE SENTENCING REFORM AND CORRECTIONS
ACT OF 2017, (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
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Professor Berman describes the Act as the most significant piece
of sentencing legislation in decades:
President Donald J. Trump officially signed the FIRST STEP Act into
law today, and I am so very excited that a significant piece of
sentencing and prison reform finally became law after years and years
and years of talk and effort by so many. I wish the reform was even
more significant, especially on the sentencing side, but something is
better than nothing and but for a modest reform to crack sentencing
terms, we really have had nothing positive coming from Congress on
the sentencing side in more than [twenty plus] years.86

The Act deals with more aspects of prison reform than
sentencing changes, but has several aspects that will reduce the
length of prison terms of some offenders, thereby reducing federal
prison numbers. The Act is expected to apply to approximately
thirty percent of federal prisoners.87
The Act will make substantial reforms to mandatory
minimum sentencing policy. First, it will give judges more discretion
in handing down mandatory minimum sentences by expanding socalled “safety valves.”88 These give judges important decisionmaking authority for certain offenses, most notably those involving
nonviolent drug crimes.89 It also shortens the amount of time for
mandatory minimum drug crime sentencing overall.90 Second, the
Act relaxes the “three strikes” rule, which subjected triple offenders
to life sentences, by reducing the mandatory minimum amount from
life to twenty-five years.91 While still a very high number, it is a
substantial decrease from life. Finally, the Act takes the already
successful reforms from the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which
reduced the disparity between sentences for crack and powder
cocaine offenses, and applies it retroactively to those convicted before
that law’s passage in 2010.92 This will apply to some three thousand

publications/prison-and-sentencing-impact-assessments/March_2018_Impact_Analysis_
for_CBO.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4BP-NPF6].
86 Douglas A. Berman, Prez Trump Signs Historic (Though Modest) FIRST
STEP Act into Law . . . and Now Comes the Critical Work of Implementing It Well!!,
SENT’G L. & POL’Y (Dec. 21, 2018), https://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_
policy/2018/12/prez-trump-signs-historic-though-modest-first-step-act-into-law-andnow-comes-the-critical-work-of-i.html [https://perma.cc/MJR5-5FE5].
87 Gina Martinez, The Bipartisan Criminal-Justice Bill Will Affect Thousands of
Prisoners. Here’s How Their Lives Will Change, TIME (Dec. 20, 2018), http://time.com/5483066/
congress-passes-bipartisan-criminal-justice-reform-effort/ [https://perma.cc/57DD-EQJ8].
88 German Lopez, The First Step Act, Explained, VOX (Feb. 5, 2019),
https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/12/18/18140973/state-of-the-union-trumpfirst-step-act-criminal-justice-reform [https://perma.cc/9TA4-2JUZ].
89 Id.
90 Grawert & Lau, supra note 84.
91 Id.
92 Id.
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inmates and make an important impact on the racial disparity that
plagues drug conviction rates.93
The Act also makes important changes for inmates after
they are convicted. “Good-time credits” are awarded to inmates
for good behavior during their incarceration periods and reduces
the length of their stay in prison.94 While this was previously
capped at forty-seven days per year of incarceration, inmates can
now earn up to fifty-four days for every year of their sentence.95
This change will also apply retroactively, affecting some four
thousand inmates.96 It will vary widely based on the amount of
time of an inmate’s sentence, but will have the effect of
facilitating the release of some offenders from the day the bill
takes effect.97 It also expands the ability to get these credits by
providing inmates with more options to accumulate them.98
Prison inmates would now receive credits for taking vocational
training courses, among other educational offerings.99 Not only
does this shorten the length of time spent in prison, but it can
also potentially reduce recidivism rates by allowing inmates to
spend less time in prison and more time in halfway houses and
under community supervision.100
Additionally, there are significant criminal justice
reforms occurring in numerous states, which aim at lowering
the punitiveness of the system. Bill Keller observed that
between 2010 and 2015, thirty-one states reduced their rate of
imprisonment and their state crime rates.101 In 2014 and 2015,
forty-six states passed reform legislation with the intent to:
[C]reating or expanding opportunities to divert people away from the
criminal justice system; reducing prison populations by enacting
sentencing reform, expanding opportunities for early release from
prison, and reducing the number of people admitted to prison for
violating the terms of their community supervision.102

Id.
Lopez, supra note 88.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Bill Keller, Nine Lessons About Criminal Justice Reform, MARSHALL
PROJECT (July 19, 2017), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/07/19/nine-lessonsabout-criminal-justice-reform [https://perma.cc/L4BW-DYJK].
102 REBECCA SILBER ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE IN REVIEW: NEW TRENDS
IN STATE SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 2014–2015, at 3, 6–7 (2016), https://storage.google
apis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/justice-in-review-new-trends-in-statesentencing-and-corrections-2014-2015/legacy_downloads/state-sentencing-and-correctionstrends-2014-2015-updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VVL-RAMA]. Wide ranging reforms are
93
94
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The ten states with the largest reduction in prison
numbers also enjoyed an average crime rate decrease of fourteen
percent.103 The so-called “Red States” have been especially active
in implementing reforms which reduce incarceration numbers.104
Holly Harris and Andrew Howard noted this phenomenon:
First and foremost, it is conservatives in big red states like Texas,
Georgia, and South Carolina who have led the way on justice reform
issues for a decade. These efforts yielded great success in safely
reducing the prison population, saving significant taxpayer resources,
and most importantly lowering crime and recidivism rate . . . .
Surveys in states that will have hotly-contested Senate races such as
Florida, Illinois, North Carolina, Nevada, and Speaker Ryan’s home
state of Wisconsin show support for reform issues ranging from the
60s to high 80s. The smart political play is to embrace these reforms.
Doing otherwise could backfire. Just ask Alaska’s then-incumbent
Senator Mark Begich. In the state’s 2014 U.S. Senate race, Begich
attacked his Republican opponent, Dan Sullivan, alleging he was soft
on crime. Sullivan emerged victorious over Begich and is currently
serving as the junior senator from Alaska.105

occurring in Ohio and Michigan. See Reforming the Nation’s Criminal Justice System: The
Impact of 2015 and Prospects for 2016, U.S. JUST. ACTION NETWORK 9 (Dec. 2015), http://www.
justiceactionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Justice-Action-Network-Year-EndReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WLV-HVJH]. Texas, like Ohio and Michigan, is engaging in wide
ranging criminal justice reforms. See Adam Brandon et al., Congress Should Follow the Red
States’ Lead on Criminal-Justice Reform, NAT’L REV. (May 2, 2016), http://
www.nationalreview.com/article/434783/criminal-justice-reform-conservatives-have-led-way
[https://perma.cc/MN7M-A3BM]. For a summary of recent changes in some states to lower
penalties for property, drunk driving and other low-level offenders, see Sarah Breitenbach,
Prisons, Policing at Forefront of State Criminal Justice Action, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (June 27,
2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2016/06/27/prisonspolicing-at-forefront-of-state-criminal-justice-action [https://perma.cc/X4FB-M6FG]; see also
State Advances in Criminal Justice Reform, 2016, SENT’G PROJECT (Jan. 2017),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/State-Advances-in-CriminalJustice-Reform-2016-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7MD-P7RD]; TEX. H.R., H. COMM. ON CORR.,
INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE, 84th Sess. (2016), http://www.house.
state.tx.us/_media/pdf/committees/reports/84interim/Corrections-Committee-Interim-Report2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2VP-HM3H] [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT]; Adam Gelb & Jacob
Denney, National Prison Rate Continues to Decline Amid Sentencing, Re-Entry Reforms, PEW
CHARITABLE TRS. (Jan. 16, 2018), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/analysis/
2018/01/16/national-prison-rate-continues-to-decline-amid-sentencing-re-entry-reforms
[https://perma.cc/6P4F-DUYM].
103 Bill Keller, Nine Lessons About Criminal Justice Reform, MARSHALL
PROJECT (July 19, 2017), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/07/19/nine-lessonsabout-criminal-justice-reform.
104 Red States are ones that traditionally support Republican candidates for
president and skew conservative. Ron Elving, The Color of Politics: How Did Red And
Blue States Come to Be?, NPR (Nov. 13, 2014, 5:00 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/
2014/11/13/363762677/the-color-of-politics-how-did-red-and-blue-states-come-to-be
[https://perma.cc/Q6UJ-VAJ2].
105 Holly Harris & Andrew Howard, Ryan’s victory Trumps Justice Reform
Opponents, HILL (Aug. 15, 2016), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/crime/291500ryans-victory-trumps-justice-reform-opponents [https://perma.cc/BL26-VSNN]; see also
Grover Norquist, Conservatives for Criminal Justice Reform, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 26,
2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/conservatives-for-criminal-justice-reform-15064639
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The Brennan Center has observed that “[i]n fact, [twenty-seven]
states have reduced both imprisonment and crime in the last
decade.”106
Former President Obama made clemency for minor drug
offenses a theme in his final year in office and granted over 1,500
clemency approvals and pardons in his last months as
president.107 These efforts greatly exceeded clemency efforts
undertaken by past presidents but made little change in overall
prison numbers. Obama’s historic program “has affected less
than one-tenth of one percent of the national prison and jail
population.”108 President Trump seems to be continuing this
trend, and in June 2018 indicated that he was considering up to
three thousand offenders for possible clemency.109
Such efforts can reduce the prison population but
attempts to roll back mass incineration have been erratic and
lacking a central ideological drive.110 Even with the limited
federal reforms and the more comprehensive state movement,
little difference has been made in total American prison
numbers. The efforts to roll back “tough on crime” agendas from
previous decades have led to minor reductions. 2011 and 2012
saw a slight decrease in total prison numbers (approximately
70 [https://perma.cc/7ZBB-AHJL]. Oklahoma has also recently passed legislation aimed
to reduce prison numbers. Barbara Hoberock, Criminal Justice Reform Bills Signed into
Law by Oklahoma Governor, TULSA WORLD (Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.tulsaworld.com/
news/capitol_report/criminal-justice-reform-bills-signed-into-law-by-oklahomagovernor/article_842d52ae-4512-5311-899c-665f31f2e90b.html [https://perma.cc/37J4BA2A]. The developments in Georgia are discussed in Greg Bluestein’s article, Nathan
Deal Aims to Cut ‘Extraordinarily High Number of Georgia Offenders on Probation, AJC
(Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.ajc.com/blog/politics/nathan-deal-aims-cut-extraordinarilyhigh-number-georgia-offenders-probation/Q8WwM1Ssny7oIOPT68TVvN
[https://perma.cc/FSV3-4LRT].
106 EISEN & CHETTIAR, supra note 42, at 1.
107 See Gregory Korte, Obama Grants 330 More Commutations, Bringing Total to
a Record 1,715, USA TODAY (Jan. 19, 2017), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/
2017/01/19/obama-grants-330-more-commutations-bringing-total-record-1715/96791186
[https://perma.cc/8WHA-PMZF]; The Editorial Board, Mr. Obama, Pick Up Your Pardon
Pen, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/16/opinion/mr-obamapick-up-your-pardon-pen.html [https://perma.cc/H5LW-3YS9]. For analysis of this, see
generally Paul J. Larkin, Jr., “A Day Late and a Dollar Short”: President Obama’s Clemency
Initiative 2014, 16 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 147 (2018).
108 TASK FORCE ON MASS INCARCERATION, N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, MASS INCARCERATION:
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?, at 1–3 (2017), http://documents.nycbar.org/files/mass_
incarceration_where_do_we_go_from_here.pdf [https://perma.cc/KG9L-94EB].
109 Doina Chiacu, Muhammad Ali Family Lawyer to Trump: Thanks, but No
Pardon Needed, REUTERS (June 8, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trumppardons/trump-considering-3000-pardons-including-boxer-muhammad-ali-idUSKCN1
J41SR [https://perma.cc/76CN-AY5X].
110 Carrie Pettus-Davis et al., Guideposts for the Era of Smart Decarceration:
Smart Decarceration Strategies for Practitioners, Advocates, Reformers and Researchers,
INST. FOR JUST. RES. & DEV. (Feb. 2017), https://ijrd.csw.fsu.edu/sites/g/files/upcbnu
1766/files/media/images/publication_pdfs/Guideposts_for_the_Era_of_Smart_
Decarceration.pdf [https://perma.cc/88XF-6P5C].
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three percent).111 This trend was reversed the following year112
only to dip again in 2014,113 2015 and marginally in 2016.114
These changes are negligible and lack the expanse and focus
that any impactful solution would require.115
According to a study by the Vera Institute in June 2018,
at the current pace of the prison population decline it would take
149 years for U.S. incarceration rates to reach the levels they
were at 1970 (i.e., before the mass incarceration era).116 The report
also notes that there is no general move towards lower prison
numbers:
At the same time, while aggregated national prison population data
indicates slow decline, it cannot be the sole indicator used to measure
the progress made in the nation’s recent efforts to reduce incarceration.
Prison populations are slow to change after the implementation of most
policy or practice changes, and thus provide an inadequate metric by
which to measure and adjust the immediate impact of reforms—or
regressive legislation. Furthermore, a reliance on aggregate prison data
fails to acknowledge or measure the tremendous variation in
incarceration trends from state to state and within states, and ignores
a significant locus of incarceration: local jails—county- or municipallyrun facilities that primarily hold people arrested but not yet convicted
of a crime. For example, while much of the country is locking fewer
people in jails and prisons, Kentucky is doing the opposite. If jails and
prisons continue to grow in Kentucky as they have since 2000, everyone
in the state will be incarcerated in 113 years.117

111 E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN
2012: TRENDS IN ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES, 1991-2012, at 1 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/p12tar9112.pdf [https://perma.cc/97CJ-JPMM].
112 See Matthew Friedman, Just Facts: The U.S. Prison Population Is Down (A
Little), BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/usprison-population-down-little [https://perma.cc/G55D-HFKW].
113 In 2014, there was a slight decrease in federal and state prison numbers but
this was partially offset by an increase in local jail numbers. See Friedman, supra note
112. State and federal prison numbers decreased by 15,400 people from December 31,
2013 to December 31, 2014. However, county and city jail numbers increased by 13,384
inmates from mid-year 2013 to mid-year 2014. While these time periods are not aligned,
they are indicative of a larger trend. The increasing jail numbers are eclipsing the
progress made by decreasing prison numbers. Id.
114 The number of prisoners fell by 51,300 to 2,136,600 (i.e. a drop of about
2.5%). KAEBLE & GLAZE, supra note 34, at 1–2.
115 There are no official statistics for prison numbers at years end 2017, but it
is estimated that there was a reduction of approximately 1% (i.e. 19,400 people) from the
previous year. See Oliver Hinds et al., People in Prison in 2017, VERA INST. JUST. 3 (May
2018), https://www.vera.org/publications/people-in-prison-2017 [https://perma.cc/69EGPLAZ].
116 JACOB KANG-BROWN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE THE NEW DYNAMICS OF
MASS INCARCERATION 5 (2018), https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downl
oads/Publications/the-new-dynamics-of-mass-incarceration/legacy_downloads/the-newdynamics-of-mass-incarceration-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/69TU-WXF5].
117 Id. at 6.
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While there has been a small reduction in the incarceration
level in the United States in recent years, recent studies do not
suggest that this has resulted in an increase in the crime rate.
Violent crime did increase in the years 2015 and 2016, however, this
trend has changed.118 The most recent data from the FBI shows that
there were minor reductions in both violent crimes and property
crimes in the second half of 2017 when compared with the first half
of 2016.119 Most recently, in June 2018, Attorney General Jeff
Sessions noted that preliminary data for 2018 indicated that there
was a 3.8% drop in violent crime and a 4.7% decline in the number
of murders.120 This is supported by the findings of a Brennan Center
report in June 2018, which notes that in 2017:
The overall crime rate in the [thirty] largest cities in 2017 declined slightly
from the previous year, falling by 2.1 percent to remain at historic lows
[and] [t]he violent crime rate declined as well, falling by [one] percent from
2016, essentially remaining stable. Violent crime remains near the bottom
of the nation’s [thirty]-year downward trend.121

The movements in probation and parole numbers have
been on a downward trend since 2008, but the reductions have
come against the backdrop of an enormous increase in the
number of adults under community supervision orders, which
went to over five million adults in 2007. The Bureau of Justice
Statistics (BJS) report released in April 2018 notes that at yearend 2016, there were 4,537,100 adults under community
supervision (probation or parole). This was down 1.1% (49,800
offenders) from the previous year. This meant that one in fiftyfive adults in the United States were under probation or parole
at the end of 2016.122
Thus, the past four decades in the United States has
witnessed a “tough on crime” agenda, but this is slowly wilting against
the backdrop of an unsustainable public budget and a growing
realization that tougher penalties do not equate to enhanced
community safety. The sharp end of the increasingly punitive stance
against offenders has been a burgeoning incarceration rate, but
probation and parole numbers have increased to an even larger
Eisen & Chettiar, supra note 42, at 1.
Preliminary Semiannual Uniform Crime Report, January-June, 2017, FBI.GOV,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/preliminary-report/home [https://perma.cc/H9MR-9SPV].
120 Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks to the Western Conservative
Summit, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (June 8, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorneygeneral-sessions-delivers-remarks-western-conservative-summit
[https://perma.cc/2YZ3-8E8V].
121 Ames Grawert et al., Crime in 2017: Final Analysis, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST., https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Crime_in_2017_A_Fin
al_Analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/YY95-7R76].
122 PROBATION AND PAROLE, supra note 2.
118
119
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extent. As noted above, the conditions associated with probation and
parole have become increasingly onerous, and at the same time, less
resources have been committed to these sanctions.123 This is part of
the reason for the high breach and recidivism rates associated with
these sanctions, as is detailed in Part II below. The promising aspect
of recent developments in the criminal justice system is that there is
a considerable recognition that change in the use and nature of
criminal sanctions is necessary. In Part IV we set out the optimal
reforms that should occur to the probation and parole. Prior to doing
so, we contextualize our proposals by providing an overview of the
appropriate aims of sentencing.
II.

THE APPROPRIATE AIMS OF SENTENCING

There are a number of orthodox and well-established aims
of sentencing. All jurisdictions in the United States pursue the
objectives of “community protection . . . general deterrence, specific
deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.”124 Generally, there is
no ranking of these aims, although over the past forty years, the
objective that has assumed cardinal status is community
protection.125 The sentencing process is made more complex by the
fact that the objectives often favor different outcomes. Thus, for
example, general deterrence inclines in favor of heavier sentences,
while rehabilitation favors more lenient dispositions.
A key reason for the unsatisfactory state of sentencing law
and practice is that sentencing practice is largely not informed by
empirical knowledge regarding the capacity for state-imposed
sanctions to achieve the stated goals of sentencing. There is a
major disconnect between sentencing knowledge and practice,
largely because the “tough on crime” political and social agenda
has drowned out the influence of empirical learning in this area.126
There is, in fact, a degree of scientific consensus regarding the
viability of most sentencing objectives. The weight of evidence
strongly suggests that the key to reducing crime is not increasing
penalty levels, but rather the rate of detection and enforcement of
breaches of the criminal law.127
See supra Part I.
See Mirko Bagaric et al., Bringing Sentencing into the 21st Century: Closing
the Gap Between Practice and Knowledge by Introducing Expertise into Sentencing Law,
45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 785, 791 (2017).
125 Id.
126 See id. at 786–87.
127 See Richard Berk, New Claims About Executions and General Deterrence:
Déjà Vu All Over Again?, 2 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 303, 328 (2005); Steven D. Levitt,
Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and
Six that Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 178 (2004); Paul R. Zimmerman, State
123
124
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There is a very small correlation between higher
penalties and lower crime.128 The best way to discourage crime is
to make potential offenders believe that if they offend, they will
be apprehended. This means that the goal of general deterrence
cannot be used as a basis for setting harsh penalties. The failure
of general deterrence theory has been supported by recent
analysis of the incarceration rate of drug offenders and the
distribution and use of illicit drugs. A PEW Research Report in
March 2018 noted that high levels of imprisonment for drug
offenses do not reduce drug use or drug arrests.129
The objective of specific deterrence aims to discourage
offending by individual offenders as opposed to the general
community.130 It is premised on the assumption that harsh penalties
will teach offenders a lesson and disincline them from reoffending.
Empirical data shows that this is flawed. Harsh penalties in the
form of prison terms in fact seem to have a slight criminogenic
effect—they slightly increase the likelihood of reoffending.131
Rehabilitation aims to elicit positive attitudinal reform in
offenders by altering their value set such that they are less likely to
commit a crime. The evidence about the efficacy of sentencing
practice to achieve this goal has fluctuated greatly over the past few
decades, but current data suggests that properly designed programs

Executions, Deterrence, and the Incidence of Murder, 7 J. APPLIED ECON. 163 (2004);
Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the
Null Hypothesis, 30 CRIME & JUST. 143, 143–45 (2003); Dale O. Cloninger & Roberto
Marchesini, Execution and Deterrence: A Quasi-Controlled Group Experiment, 33
Applied Econ. 569 (2001).
128 Mirko Bagaric & Theo Alexander, (Marginal) General Deterrence Doesn’t
Work—And What It Means for Sentencing, 35 CRIM. L.J. 269 (2011). Recent data,
however, suggests that focused deterrence efforts may be more effective. Anthony A.
Braga et al., Focused Deterrence Strategies and Crime Control: An Updated Systematic
Review and Meta-Analysis of the Empirical Evidence, 17 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 205,
205 (2018) (“[F]ocused deterrence strategies are associated with an overall statistically
significant, moderate crime reduction effect.”).
129 PEW CHARITABLE TRS., MORE IMPRISONMENT DOES NOT REDUCE STATE
DRUG PROBLEMS 5 (2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2018/03/pspp_
more_imprisonment_does_not_reduce_state_drug_problems.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2YWM-6P3A].
130 See Daniel S. Nagin et al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, 38 CRIME & JUST.
115, 124 (2009).
131 See Donald P. Green & Daniel Winik, Using Random Judge Assignments to
Estimate the Effects of Incarceration and Probation on Recidivism Among Drug
Offenders, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 357, 382–83 (2010); DONALD RITCHIE, SENTENCING
ADVISORY COUNCIL, SENTENCING MATTERS: DOES IMPRISONMENT DETER? A REVIEW OF
THE EVIDENCE 18, 22 (2011); DON WEATHERBURN ET AL., AUSTL. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY,
THE SPECIFIC DETERRENT EFFECT OF CUSTODIAL PENALTIES ON JUVENILE REOFFENDING 5 (2009); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE
LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 245 (1973); NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM’N,
SENTENCING (Report No 139, July 2013).
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can reduce recidivism levels for most offenders.132 It is clear,
however, that merely consigning offenders to prison is not conducive
to rehabilitation. A wide-ranging report by the United States
Sentencing Commission in 2018 examined the reoffending patterns
of federal offenders released in 2005 and noted that over an eightyear period, 49.3% were rearrested and that the median re-arrest
period was twenty-one months.133 The picture is even bleaker at the
state level with the BJS finding that “76.6 percent of offenders
released from state prison[s] were rearrested within five years.”134
The rearrest rate of state prisoners increases considerably
if the follow-up period is extended. A report released in May 2018
examined the behavior of offenders released from states prisons
across thirty states in the United States over a period of nine
years.135 It noted that eighty-three percent of the offenders were
arrested at least once during this period.136 The highest recidivism
levels were for offenders who had initially been sentenced for
property offenses and the lowest rearrest rate was for those who
had committed violent offenses.137
The main manner in which community protection has
been more vigorously pursued is incapacitation in the form
imprisonment. The confinement associated with incarceration
ensures that offenders cannot commit crimes in the community
during the period of the sentence. The efficacy of imprisonment,
however, is undermined in some situations by the fact that its
financial cost outweighs the benefit associated with preventing
minor criminal acts, especially property, immigration and lowlevel drug offenses.138 The empirical data suggests that prison

132 See Mirko Bagaric et al., Mitigating America’s Mass Incarceration Crisis
Without Compromising Community Protection: Expanding the Role of Rehabilitation in
Sentencing, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 36–42 (2018). See Stephen Steurer, Why Aren’t
We Spending More on Prisoner Education?, CRIME REP. (June 8, 2018), https://
thecrimereport.org/2018/06/08/why-arent-we-spending-more-on-prisoner-education/
[https://perma.cc/2HG7-RU3C], for more recent data demonstrating that education
significantly diminished the rate of recidivism of prisoners.
133 KIM STEVEN HUNT & ROBERT DUMVILLE, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
RECIDIVISM AMONG FEDERAL OFFENDERS: A COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW 15 (2016),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2016/recidivism_overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UVM-VA3Q].
134 Id.
135 MARIEL ALPER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 250975, 2018 UPDATE ON
PRISONER RECIDIVISM: A 9-YEAR FOLLOW-UP PERIOD (2005-2014), at 15 (2018),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/18upr9yfup0514.pdf [https://perma.cc/69C9-UP2J].
136 Id. at 1.
137 Id.
138 See Mirko Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the Crime—Not the Prior
Convictions of the Person that Committed the Crime: An Argument for Less Impact Being
Accorded to Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 343, 402, 405–11
(2014).
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should be confined for offenders that commit serious violent and
sexual offenses.139
There is no clear meaning of retribution. In the
sentencing domain, however, it is generally used to refer to the
concept of proportionality, which is the principle that “the
seriousness of the crime [should] be matched by the [severity] of
the [punishment].”140 As noted above, there is clear evidence that
this principle is widely ignored as a result of the overly harsh
penalties for many drug, immigration, and property offenses.141
Thus, the weight of empirical evidence suggests that a
scientifically sound sentencing system would result in the
abolition of the goals of specific deterrence and general
deterrence and a narrowing of the use of incapacitation to only
serious sexual and violent offenses.142 Moreover, the principle of
proportionality would be the guiding determinant in relation to
setting type, duration and severity.143
Against this backdrop we evaluate the efficacy of the
probation and parole systems, and also the new sanctions proposed
in this article. We start by taking a closer look at the current use of
probation and parole.
III.

OVERVIEW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE

There are two main criminal sanctions which involve
supervised release. Probation is a sanction imposed by a court,
which is often used as an alternative to prison. Parole is a postincarceration order which involves a statutory body, typically
known as a Parole Board, releasing an offender into the
community. Probation and parole are very common sanctions. As
noted in the Introduction to this Article, currently there are over
3,673,000 adult offenders under probation and approximately
875,000 on parole.144
Probation is used far more extensively—about three
times the rate—at the state level than in relation to federal
crimes. Thus, it has been noted:
See id.
Mirko Bagaric & Sandeep Gopalan, Sound Principles, Undesirable
Outcomes: Justice Scalia’s Paradoxical Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 50 AKRON L.
REV. 301, 303 n.6 (2016) (quoting Mirko Bagaric & Sandeep Gopalan, Saving the United
States From Lurching To Another Sentencing Crisis: Taking Proportionality Seriously
and Implementing Fair Fixed Penalties, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 169, 189 (2016)).
141 See supra Part I.
142 Id.
143 See Mirko Bagaric & Sandeep Gopalan, Saving the United States from
Lurching to Another Sentencing Crisis: Taking Proportionality Seriously and
Implementing Fair Fixed Penalties, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 169, 173 (2016).
144 PROBATION AND PAROLE, supra note 2, at 1.
139
140
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According to Commission data, approximately [ten] percent of people
sentenced in federal court during 2016 received a sentence of
probation only or probation with conditions of confinement, often
meaning home confinement or electronic monitoring, in Sentencing
Zones A and B respectively. In contrast, at the state level [thirty-one]
percent of people sentenced on felony charges received a sentence of
probation only or some other non-incarceration penalty such as fines,
treatment or community service.145

Probation and parole orders both involve the imposition of certain
conditions. The conditions are similar and generally come in two main
forms: standard conditions and special conditions. These conditions
are designed to achieve the principal aims of probation and parole,
which include community protection and rehabilitation.146
Probation and parole are utilized in some form throughout
the United States, however, there is no unity regarding the
availability, use and operation of these sanctions. By way of an
overview, we now discuss the availability, use and scope of these
sanctions in the federal jurisdiction and four largest states in
America. It is not tenable to survey every state, and hence by way
of illustration we focus on the largest jurisdictions.
A.

Federal Jurisdiction

The two alternatives to incarceration at the federal level are
probation and supervised release.147 Offenders who are sentenced
to probation do not spend any time in prison after sentencing.
Additionally, supervised release occurs following the completion of
a prison term and now effectively takes the place of parole, which
at the federal level has been formally abolished.148 The United
States eliminated parole for federal sentencing in 1987 with the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.149 Only those convicted of federal
crimes committed before November 1, 1987, in Washington D.C. or
by a military tribunal are eligible for federal parole.150 For most
145 Mark Mauer et al., Public Comment on USSC’s “First Offenders/Alternatives to
Incarceration” Proposed Amendment, SENT’G PROJECT (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.sentencing
project.org/publications/public-comment-usscs-first-offendersalternatives-incarcerationproposed-amendment [https://perma.cc/4XWV-3VCR].
146 Probation and Pretrial Services - Mission, U.S.COURTS.GOV, http://www.us
courts.gov/services-forms/probation-and-pretrial-services/probation-and-pretrialservices-mission [https://perma.cc/2ZCR-UCHN].
147 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 61, at ch. 7 pt. A.
148 Id.
149 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were promulgated by the United States
Sentencing Commission. Guidelines, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, https://www.ussc.gov/Research/
Research_Projects/Miscellaneous/15_Year_Study/chap1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3T8X-GNF3];
PROBATION AND PAROLE, supra note 2.
150 Douglas C. McDonald & Kenneth E. Carlson, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
Special Report, Federal Sentencing in Transition, 1986-90, at 1 (1992) https://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fst8690.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EBF-LUX2]. The Supreme
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purposes, however, federal supervised release is still referred to as
parole, and we adopt that terminology in this article.
Congress passed the Probation Act of 1925 under President
Calvin Coolidge, which created federal probation.151 Five years later,
the National Parole Board obtained the power to supervise federal
parolees.152 In 1940, administration of the federal probation system
switched to the control of the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts.153 Federal probation and parole are governed by 18 U.S.C.
§ 3601, which states that released prisoners will be observed and
that they must report “to the degree warranted by the conditions
specified by the sentencing court.”154 These defendants are subject to
supervision by the United States Parole Commission.155
Defendants are eligible for probation unless they have
been found guilty of a Class A or B felony.156 Mandatory conditions
for supervised release and probation are set by 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3583(d) and 3563(a), respectively.157 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b) and
3583(d) allow the imposition of further conditions reasonably
related to the relevant sentencing factors.158
The United States Sentencing Commission recommends
supervised release after any prison sentence of longer than a
year.159 All those on supervised release must observe three
standard rules to stay in compliance: they must: (1) refrain from
committing a new offense; (2) refrain from any drug possession;
and (3) submit to one drug test within fifteen days of release and
two subsequent drug tests. Offenders who have committed certain
sexual offenses must maintain current registration as a sex
Court ruled in United States v. Booker that the guidelines cannot be binding on judges’
sentencing decisions. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 268 (2005).
151 Probation and Pretrial Services History, U.S.COURTS.GOV, http://www.
uscourts.gov/services-forms/probation-and-pretrial-services/probation-and-pretrialservices-history [https://perma.cc/F6ML-28KV].
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 18 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012); PROB. AND PRETRIAL SERVICES OFFICE, ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, OVERVIEW OF PROBATION AND SUPERVISED RELEASE
CONDITIONS 1 (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/overview_of_probation
_and_supervised_release_conditions_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3AX-GGGQ].
155 PROB. AND PRETRIAL SERVICES OFFICE, supra note 154, at 1 n.1.
156 18 U.S.C. § 3561(a) (2012). Class A Felonies are those that carry a sentence
of death or life in prison; class B felonies carry a maximum sentence of twenty-five years.
18 U.S.C. § 3559 (a)(1)–(2).
157 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d), 3563(a) (2012 & Supp. 2018). Those on federal
probation and supervised release cannot be found guilty of a new crime, possess drugs,
and must submit to drug testing within 15 days of release and at least two subsequent
tests over the course of probation. Further requirements apply to those convicted of
crimes that would require sexual offender registration or crimes of domestic violence. 18
U.S.C. § 3583(d).
158 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3563(b), 3583(d) (Supp. 2018).
159 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 61, at ch. 5 pt. D, cmt. n.1.(Imposition of a
Term of Supervised Release).
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offender. For certain crimes, submission to DNA testing may be
required.160 If a parolee is a first-time domestic violence offender as
defined by 18 U.S.C. § 3561(b), a court-approved rehabilitation
program must be completed.161
If a defendant’s sentence requires payment of a fine, the
parolee must pay the fine or work with the court to establish a
payment schedule.162 Any other penalties or restitution must be
paid along with a notification of any change in circumstances
that may affect the parolee’s ability to make payments.163
Conditions on restitution are set by statutes 18 U.S.C. §§ 2248,
2259, 2264, 2327, 3663, 3663A, and 3664.164
Federal statutes set a maximum range of no more than
five years of supervised release supervision for Class A or Class
B felonies and no more than three years for Class C or D
Felonies.165 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(3) caps the maximum length of
supervised release at one year for a misdemeanor.166 Federal
statutes 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b) and 3583(d) allow courts to set
additional requirements for a defendant’s probation or
supervised release.167 Courts are given wide discretion to:
[M]odify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of a sentence of probation
at any time prior to the expiration or termination of the term of
probation, pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure relating to the modification of probation and the provisions
applicable to the initial setting of the [terms and] conditions of
probation.168

Discretionary conditions must connect to the statutory
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). For supervised release these
factors are: “the nature and circumstances of the offense; the
history and characteristics of the defendant; deterrence; protection
of the public; and providing needed correctional treatment to the
defendant.”169 Probation cases use the same factors and also
consider “the seriousness of the offense . . . promot[ing] respect for
the law, and . . . provid[ing] just punishment for the offense.”170

18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).
Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 3561(b) (2012).
162 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) (Supp. 2018).
163 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(7) (2012).
164 18 U.S.C. §§ 2248 (1996), 2259 (2018), 2264 (2018), 2327 (1998), 3663 (2008),
3663A (2012), 3664 (2002).
165 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(1)–(2).
166 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (b)(3).
167 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b) (2008), 3583(d) (Supp. 2016).
168 18 U.S.C. § 3563(c) (2012).
169 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), 3553(a)(2)(B)-(D) (2018), 3583(d)(1) (2016).
170 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2)(A)), 3563(b) (2012 & Supp. 2018).
160
161
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The court’s ability to set discretionary conditions for
supervised release is limited by the language “no greater
deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary.”171 Discretion
for the probationer’s terms may “involve only such deprivations of
liberty or property as are reasonably necessary.”172 Some of the
discretionary conditions that courts may set include additional
community service, further restrictions on where a defendant can
live or travel to, limited freedom of association, financial or
substance abuse counseling, testing, and/or additional disclosure
of information.173
Furthermore, federal law mandates that all probationers
be provided with a written explanation that is “sufficiently clear
and specific to serve as a guide for the defendant’s conduct and for
such supervision as is required.”174 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) allows
courts to “extend a term of supervised release if less than the
maximum authorized term was previously imposed, and may
modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of supervised release.”175
The behavior and responsibilities of U.S. probation officers
are set by 18 U.S.C. § 3603 and the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Officers must write a report on the defendant before
the court issues its parole or supervised release terms.176 This
report must describe the prisoner’s personal history, criminal
history and prison behavior.177 Principles of supervision are set by
the Judicial Conference of the United States.178 The supervised
release program has been heavily criticized because it results in
too many offenders breaching relatively minor conditions and
then being returned to prison. Public Defender Jacob Schuman
wrote recently that:
In the federal criminal justice system, prison is just the beginning of
punishment. After prison comes “supervised release,” a set of
obligations and restrictions governing an ex-con’s day-to-day
schedule, employment, residence, and relationships. In the best-case
scenario, two-thirds of people successfully complete their term of
supervised release . . . . [However], the data show that this system is
incredibly strict, and that its reach is vast. Between 2005 and 2009,
federal judges imposed supervised release in approximately 300,000
cases, with an average term lasting over [forty] months. By 2010, more
than [ten-thousand] federal inmates were locked up for violating their
supervised release. The supervision costs the federal government
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178

18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2).
18 U.S.C. § 3563(b).
18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(1)-(22).
18 U.S.C. § 3563(d).
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1)(A).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2).
See 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (a)(1) (2012).
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$400 million annually (not including the cost of incarcerating people
for violations).179

There are no offenses that have guaranteed periods of
supervised release but certain crimes nearly always receive
supervised
release
sentences.180
Those
convicted
of
“manslaughter, sexual abuse, robbery, arson, drug trafficking,
firearms, extortion/racketeering, pornography/prostitution”
have an over ninety-nine percent likelihood of receiving
supervised release sentences, while drug possession prison
sentences are 56.7% likely to receive supervised release.181 This
cumulative number represents eight of every ten defenders
sentenced on federal charges.182 The number of federal offenders
on supervised release per year has increased from 39,000 to over
115,000 from 1995 to 2015.183 The average length of the
supervision program has increased on a smaller scale from 42.1
to 47.1 months.184 As of December 2015, 132,800 prisoners are on
federal probation or parole.185
The consequences of violating parole and probation are set
out in 18 U.S.C. § 3565 and 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) and include being
re-sent to a period of incarceration, which occurs relatively
frequently.186 It has been observed that “being sentenced to prison
rather than probation increases the probability of imprisonment
in the first [three] years after release from prison” by eighteen to
nineteen percentage points.187
A study in 2015 examined the breach rates of 454,223
offenders serving active supervision terms of supervised release
179 Jacob Schuman, America’s Shadow Criminal Justice System, NEW
REPUBLIC (May 30, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/148592/americas-shadowcriminal-justice-system [https://perma.cc/84YG-U6EE].
180 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO
SUPERVISED RELEASE 55 (2010), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/researchand-publications/research-publications/2010/20100722_Supervised_Release.pdf
[https://perma.cc/84YG-U6EE].
181 Id. at 54–55.
182 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES: FISCAL YEAR
2014, at 4 (2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2015/FY14_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf [https://perma.cc/RM2U-M4H8].
183 PEW CHARITABLE TRS., NUMBER OF OFFENDERS ON FEDERAL SUPERVISED
RELEASE HITS ALL-TIME HIGH 2 (2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2017/
01/number_of_offenders_on_federal_supervised_release_hits_alltime_high.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8HMX-J9HD]. The number of offenders on supervised release
compares to the total number of federal prisoners of 180, 181. Statistics: Past Inmate
Population Totals, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/pop
ulation_statistics.jsp [https://perma.cc/XL53-LADR].
184 PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 183, at 2.
185 KAEBLE & GLAZE, supra note 34, at 12.
186 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3565, 3583(e) (2012 & Supp. 2016)
187 David J. Harding et al., Short-and Long-term Effects of Imprisonment on Future
Felony Convictions and Prison Admissions, PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. (Oct. 17, 2017),
https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/114/42/11103.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/EUC2-DJYV].
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(eighty-one percent) and probation (nineteen percent) which
commenced between October 2004 and September 2014.188 It
observed that approximately 16.2% of offenders on these orders
had supervision revoked within the first year by committing a
second crime.189 This increases to 33.7% over three years and
41.1% over five years (the maximum possible length).190 Over the
same time intervals, the chances of revocation for a technical
violation are 5.9%, 10.8% and 11.2%.191 After supervision ends,
there exists a fifteen percent chance that the defendant will be
arrested for another offense within the next three years.192
Common major violations include drug possession, immigrant
offenses, assault, firearm possession, and larceny.193
In terms of cost, a day in a federal prison costs the U.S.
Government $79.16 per resident as compared to $9.17 per day (i.e.
$3,350 per year) for probation officer supervision.194 We now
consider the manner in which parole and probation are regulated
in the second largest state: California.
B.

California

The California system is unusual in terms of lack of
uniformity, with considerable discretion being accorded to
counties to set their own probation terms. State parole rules are
set by CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, Section 2355.195 Rules on county
parole and probation are set by CAL. PENAL CODE Section
1203.196 County Parole boards set standards according to CAL.
PENAL CODE Section 3076(b) for any prisoner in county jail or on
work furlough.197 These parole terms may not exceed three
years.198 As of December 2015, California has 349,600 offenders
on parole or probation.199

188

4 (2015).

Laura M. Baber, Inroads to Reducing Federal Recidivism, 79 FED. PROB. 3,

Id. at 6.
Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 6.
193 Id. The five most common minor offenses are traffic violations, drunk and
disorderly, simple assault, petty theft, and driving under the influence.
194 Does Prison Work?, SECURITYDEGREEHUB.COM, https://www.securitydegree
hub.com/prison/ [https://perma.cc/MY5Z-DW6B].
195 CAL CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2355 (2019)
196 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203 (2019)
197 CAL. PENAL CODE § 3076(b) (2002).
198 CAL. PENAL CODE § 3081(b) (2014).
199 DANIELLE KAEBLE & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ
250230, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2015, at 14 (2017), https://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus15.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5VU-LAHH].
189
190
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Defendants who have been convicted of two prior felonies
or most aggravated felonies are not eligible for probation.200 The
California conditions for parole and probation are similar to
those federally.201 One notable exception is the requirement that
those on parole can be the subject of “search or seizure by a
probation or parole officer or other peace officer at any time of
the day or night, with or without a search warrant or with or
without cause.”202
For certain prisoners, post-incarceration supervision is
handled at a county rather than a state level. Eligible prisoners—
those with non-violent, non-serious, and non-sexual convictions—
are allowed to enter post-release community supervision (PRCS).203
CAL. PENAL CODE Section 3451(a) limits post-incarceration
supervision to three years.204
In 2011, the California Assembly passed split sentences
with Assembly Bill 109. Intended to alleviate California’s
overburdened prison population, split sentences lead to a
bifurcated sentence: half of a defendant’s time is spent in
incarceration while half is under mandatory supervision. These
sentences are mandatory for many minor convictions “[u]nless
the court finds that, in the interests of justice, it is not
appropriate in a particular case.”205 This realignment also means
that defendants who violate probation will be housed in county
jails instead of being returned to state prison.206 The maximum
time that can be spent in county jail for revocation is 180 days.207
In a departure from recent pushes for judicial discretion
to give probation and community supervision, 2016 Assembly
Bill AB 2888 removed the ability of judges to grant community

200 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(e) (2019). Crimes that can render a defendant
ineligible for probation include “burglary with explosives, rape with force or violence,
torture, aggravated mayhem, murder, attempt to commit murder, trainwrecking,
extortion, kidnapping, [and] escape from the state prison.” § 1203(e)(1).
201 See supra Part III.
202 CAL. PENAL CODE § 3067(b)(3) (2012). This requirement was upheld by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846, 857 (2006).
203 CAL. PENAL CODE § 3450 (2011); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, §§ 3079-79.1
(2012).
204 CAL. PENAL CODE § 3451(a) (2015).
205 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(h)(5)(A) (2018).
206 Another means to combat prison overcrowding was approved in September 2010
when the California Legislature passed Senate Bill 1266 to establish the Alternative Custody
Program. Non-serious, non-violent offenders and non-sex offenders may be permitted to serve
the remainder of their sentences in a residential home or other facility that offers individual
services. S.B. 1266, Assemb. Reg. Sess. 2009-2010 (Cal. 2010).
207 Parole Revocation Proceedings: FAQs, ADMIN. OFF. CTS., at 28 (2013),
http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/FAQs-Parole-Revocation-Proceedings.pdf.
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supervision for any defendant convicted of sexual offenses
against an incapacitated or unconscious party.208
An inmate in a California prison costs the state
approximately $59,919 per year. Annual parole costs equal
$10,182 and probation costs are $4,438.209 Currently, 5.6% of
California probations end in failure.210 Parole’s three year failure
rate for inmates released in 2011 (the last year surveyed) was
considerably higher at 30.3%.211
C.

Texas

Texas parole and probation decisions have been managed
by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Board of Pardons
and Paroles since 1985.212 As of December 2015, Texas had
88,893 offenders on parole programs213 and 488,800 residents on
any form of community supervision programs.214 Section 508 of
the Texas Government Code sets the standards and conditions.
Eligibility criteria are set in Texas Government Code Sections
508.145 and 508.149.215 The Texas legislature has referred to
“probation” as “community supervision” since 1993.216
All Texas defendants are eligible for community supervision
unless their offense carries a prison term of over ten years or a term
of confinement under Section 12.35 of the Penal Code.217 The
determination of who will receive community supervision and the
conditions to be imposed are set by the sentencing judge.218 The same
judge can modify these conditions at any time. Minimum possible
supervision sentences are two years for a misdemeanor and ten
years for a felony.219 Basic community supervision restrictions
include (but are not limited to): avoiding future offenses, avoiding
members of street gangs, submitting to substance testing,
A.B. 2888, Assemb. Reg. Sess. 2016-2017. (Cal. 2016).
Ryken Grattet & Brandon Martin, Probation in California, PUB. POL’Y INST. CAL.
(Dec. 2015), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/jtf/JTF_ProbationJTF.pdf [https://perma.cc/UR42N5GS].
210 Id. Failure is considered a “ revocations to jail or prison.” Id.
211 SCOTT KERNAN, ET AL., CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., 2015 OUTCOME
EVALUATION REPORT, at 50 (2016), https://sites.cdcr.ca.gov/research/wp-content/uploads/
sites/9/2018/04/2015-Outcome-Evaluation-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BDB-HAY2].
212 Revised Parole Guidelines, TEX. BOARD PARDONS & PAROLES, http://www.
tdcj.state.tx.us/bpp/parole_guidelines/parole_guidelines.html [https://perma.cc/PWR5-HSJT].
213 Adult Parole System in Texas, LEGIS. BUDGET BOARD. (June 2014), http://
www.lbb.state.tx.us/Documents/Publications/Issue_Briefs/1388_Adult_Parole_System_
In_TX.pdf [https://perma.cc/XE3S-HCLR].
214 KAEBLE & BONCZAR, supra note 199, at 15.
215 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 508.145, .149 (WEST 2017).
216 Id.; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A (West 2017).
217 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.053(c) (West 2017).
218 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.051 (West 2017).
219 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 3.
208
209
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permitting searching of the home, attending regular meetings,
remaining employed, and paying any relevant fines.220
Texas prisoners are eligible for parole unless they have
been sentenced to death or life with no possibility of parole.
Qualifying for parole requires a two-thirds vote by the Parole
Board.221 Incarcerated prisoners are considered on a list of static
and dynamic factors.222 Static factors are: “[a]ge at first admission
to a juvenile or adult correctional facility; [h]istory of supervisory
release revocations for felony offenses; [p]rior incarcerations;
[e]mployment history; and [t]he commitment offense.”223 Dynamic
factors considered are: “[t]he offender’s current age; [w]hether the
offender is a confirmed security threat group (gang) member;
[e]ducation, vocational and certified on-the-job training programs
completed during the present incarceration; [p]rison disciplinary
conduct; and [c]urrent prison custody level.”224
As with all states, the parole board has considerable
flexibility for setting parole conditions.225 Mandatory conditions
of release include assigning a county for the defendant to reside
in (typically the county they were residing in prior to
incarceration or the county that will likely ensure the greatest
likelihood of a successful parole program).226 Parolees must also
attain an educational equivalent of at least sixth grade or
higher227 and undergo controlled substance testing.228
The Texas Legislature recently modified the process for
handling alleged supervision violations. Previously, the accused
defendant would be incarcerated in a county lockup until a
hearing, resulting in considerable costs to the county and the
defendant.229 Texas now allows the defendant to remain at home
until the process hearings begin.230
According to Marc Levin, director of the Center for
Effective Justice at the Texas Public Policy Foundation, housing
a Texan prisoner costs the state $53 a day compared to $3 a day
for parolees and less than $2 a day for probationers.231 Further,
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 11.1-24.
TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 145.1 (West 2019).
222 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 145.2. (West 2019).
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 See id.
226 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.181 (West 2019).
227 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.183 (West 2019).
228 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.184 (West 2019).
229 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 102, at 9.
230 Id.
231 Johnathan Silver, Texas Prisons Ponder Cutting $250 Million, TEX. TRIBUNE
(Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/08/03/prisons-agency-could-see-250million-budget-cuts [https://perma.cc/7W77-L2J2].
220
221
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in 2014, 6.5% of Texas parolees were found in violation of parole
terms, 80% of these violations were due to committing a new
offense. The same year, 15.6% of defendants on probation
violated their conditions, and in 50.7% of these instances was
due to committing a new offense.232 Having examined the law
and practice in relation to parole and probation in the two
largest states, we now move to the third largest state: New York.
D.

New York

New York Penal Law Section 65.10 sets the conditions for
New York probation.233 New York Penal Law Section 70.45 sets the
terms of New York post-release supervision.234 New York’s
maximum allowed felony probation sentences are longer than most
states, a maximum of five years as compared to the average state’s
cap of two or five years.235 The general New York probation
conditions are very similar to the general parole conditions.236
More than 200 years ago, New York started to use good
behavior and parole as an alternative to sentencing. Section 70.40
of the New York State Penal Law created a unique New York
supervision program entitled “Good Time,”237 beginning in 1817.238
Good Time is a form of rehabilitative behavior credit for prisoners
and allows New York prisoners to begin post-incarceration
release earlier than the court-appointed date. This can be done
after six-sevenths of the minimum time has elapsed for prisoners
with determinate sentences or in the case of prisoners with
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 102, at 13.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10 (McKinney 2019).
234 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.45 (McKinney 2019).
235 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.00(3)(a)(i) (McKinney 2014); JUSTICE CTR., IMPROVING
PROBATION AND ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION IN NEW YORK STATE: INCREASING
PUBLIC SAFETY & REDUCING SPENDING ON PRISONS AND JAILS 4 (2013), https://csgjustice
center.org/corrections/projects/ny-state-probation-incarceration-study
[https://perma.cc/23JA-F98A] [hereinafter IMPROVING PROBATION].
236 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10 (2)(a)-(g) (McKinney 2019). “When imposing a
sentence of probation or of conditional discharge, the court shall, as a condition of the
sentence, consider restitution or reparation and may, as a condition of the sentence,
require that the defendant: Avoid injurious or vicious habits; Refrain from frequenting
unlawful or disreputable places or consorting with disreputable persons; Work faithfully
at a suitable employment or faithfully pursue a course of study or of vocational training
that will equip him for suitable employment; Undergo available medical or psychiatric
treatment and remain in a specified institution, when required for that purpose;
Participate in an alcohol or substance abuse program or an intervention program
approved by the court after consultation with the local probation department having
jurisdiction, or such other public or private agency as the court determines to be
appropriate; Support his dependents and meet other family responsibilities; Make
restitution of the fruits of his or her offense or make reparation, in an amount he can
afford to pay, for the actual out-of-pocket loss caused thereby.”
237 Id.
238 GRAY CAVENDER, PAROLE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1982).
232
233

1262

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:4

indeterminate sentences, where the good time credits exceed the
remaining incarceration period.
Prisoners who are serving one or more indeterminate
sentences become eligible for parole in New York when he or she
has served a minimum sentence set by the sentencing court.239
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1998 made all violent felony
offenders not eligible for parole.240 New York Penal Law Section
70.45 was also modified to make post-release supervision
mandatory for all determinate sentences. In 2005 and 2007,
mandatory determinate sentences expanded to drug offenders
and most sexual offenders.241 In 2003, New York amended
Section 806 to allow Presumptive Release for non-violent
inmates.242 As with most states, the conditions imposed on
parolees by the Parole Board can vary greatly but usually have
common elements similar to those set out above in relation to
the other states.243
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.40(1) (McKinney 2011).
See The Sentencing Reform Act of 1998-Jenna’s Law, N.Y.S. DEP’T CORR. &
CMTY. SUPERVISION, http://www.doccs.ny.gov/legislation-jl.html [https://perma.cc/7843QXV5].
241 Merger of Department of Correctional Services and Division of Parole, N.Y.
DEP’T CORR. & CMTY. & SUPERVISION (Apr. 2011), http://www.doccs.ny.gov/FactSheets/
DOCS-Parole-Merger.html [https://perma.cc/3ZV9-PVWG].
242 New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision
Handbook, N.Y.S. DEP’T CORR. & CMTY. SUPERVISION (July 2017), http://www.doccs.ny.
gov/CommSup_Handbook.html [https://perma.cc/2MM3-6AHK] [hereinafter Community
Supervision Handbook].
243 Id. These common requirements are typically written as “1. I will proceed
directly to the area to which I have been released and, within twenty-four (24) hours of my
release make my arrival report to the Community Supervision Office indicated on my release
agreement, unless other instructions are designated on the agreement. 2. I will make office
and/or written reports as directed. 3. I will not leave the State of New York or any other state
to which I am released or transferred, or any area defined in writing by my Parole Officer
without permission. 4. I will permit my Parole Officer to visit me at my residence and/or place
of employment and I will permit the search and inspection of my person, residence, [and]
property. I will discuss any proposed changes in my residence, employment, or program status
with my Parole Officer. I understand that I have an immediate and continuing duty to notify
my Parole Officer of any changes in my residence, employment, or program status when
circumstances beyond my control make prior discussion impossible. 5. I will reply promptly,
fully, and truthfully to any inquiry of[,] or communication by my Parole Officer or other
representative of the Department of Corrections and Supervision. 6. I will notify my Parole
Officer immediately any time I am in contact with[,] or arrested by[,] any law enforcement
agency. I understand that I have a continuing duty to notify my Parole Officer of such contact
or arrest. 7. I will not be in the company of[,] or fraternize with any person I know to have a
criminal record or whom I know to have been adjudicated a Youthful Offender[,] except for
accidental encounters in public places, work, school, or in any other instance without the
permission of my Parole Officer. 8. I will not behave in such a manner as to violate the
provisions of any law to which I am subject[,] which provide[s] for a penalty of imprisonment,
nor will my behavior threaten the safety or well-being of myself or others. 9. I will not own,
possess, or purchase any shotgun, rifle, or firearm of any type without the written permission
of my Parole Officer. I will not own, possess, or purchase any deadly weapon as defined in the
Penal Law or any dangerous knife, dirk, razor, stiletto, or imitation pistol. In addition, I will
not own, possess or purchase any instrument readily capable of causing physical injury
without a satisfactory explanation for ownership, possession or purchase. 10. In the event
239

240
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As of December 2015, New York had 145,600 persons in
community supervision programs.244 The adult probation
population of New York has steadily declined over the years (the
largest example of a decline in any state) and many New York
City residents on probation now report to kiosks instead of
probation officers.245 Probation in New York City has an eighty
percent success rate, lowering to a sixty-five percent success rate
in the rest of the state.246 Additionally, seventeen percent of New
Yorkers on supervised release commit another crime during
their period of release.247
E.

Florida

Florida’s state probation programs are set by state
statute section 948.03.248 Florida’s state legislature eliminated
parole in October 1983.249 Only inmates incarcerated for crimes
committed before October 1983 are eligible for parole.250 As of
2016, 4,552 inmates remain parole-eligible in Florida’s state
prisons.251
Florida defendants can be sentenced to probation as long
as their crime is not death-eligible.252 Florida’s probation
conditions are nearly identical to the general stipulations in other
states.253 The Florida supervised release program was created in
that I leave the jurisdiction of the State of New York, I hereby waive my right to resist
extradition to the State of New York from any state in the Union and from any territory or
country outside the United States. This waiver shall be in full force and effect until I am
discharged from Parole or Conditional Release. I fully understand that I have the right under
the Constitution of the United States and under law to contest any effort to extradite me from
another state and return me to New York, and I freely and knowingly waive this right as a
condition of my Parole or Conditional Release. 11. I will not use or possess any drug
paraphernalia or use or possess any controlled substance without proper medical
authorization. 12. Special Conditions: (as specified by the Board of Parole, Parole Officer or
other authorized representative of DOCCS). 13. I will fully comply with the instructions of my
Parole Officer and obey such special additional written conditions as he or she, a member of
the Board of Parole, or an authorized representative of the Department of Corrections and
Community Supervision, may impose.” Id.
244 KAEBLE & GLAZE, supra note 34, at 12, 15.
245 Michael P. Jacobson et al., Less Is More: How Reducing Probation Populations Can
Improve Outcomes, Papers from the Executive Session on Community Corrections, HARV.
KENNEDY SCH. 8–9 (Aug. 2017), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/wiener/
programs/pcj/files/less_is_more_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/AE2R-A5ZT].
246 IMPROVING PROBATION, supra note 235, at 3.
247 Id.
248 FLA. STAT. § 948.03 (2018).
249 Release Types, FLA. COMM’N ON OFFENDER REV., https://www.fcor.state.fl.us/
release-types.shtml [https://perma.cc/Z6QZ-ZW2N].
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 FLA. STAT. § 948.01(1) (2017).
253 FLA. STAT. § 948.03. “(1) The court shall determine the terms and conditions
of probation. Conditions specified in this section do not require oral pronouncement at
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1988 and is controlled by the Florida Commission on Offender
Review.254 A year later, Florida’s legislature created the Control
Release Authority which is a system designed to keep the state’s
prison population within manageable levels via discretionary
release reviews.255 Prisoners must serve eighty-five percent of
their sentence to be considered for release.256 Thus, this sanction
functions as a form of parole.
Florida’s incarcerated and supervised population is higher
than the national average, at 513 per 100,000 residents.257 Florida
State Statute (F.S.S.) section 948.001 prohibits officers from
monitoring more than 50 drug offenders at once. F.S.S. section
the time of sentencing and may be considered standard conditions of probation. These
conditions may include among them the following, that the probationer or offender in
community control shall: (a) Report to the probation officer as directed. (b) Permit the
probation officer to visit him or her at his or her home or elsewhere. (c) Work faithfully
at suitable employment insofar as may be possible. (d) Remain within a specified place.
(e) Live without violating any law. A conviction in a court of law is not necessary for such
a violation of law to constitute a violation of probation, community control, or any other
form of court-ordered supervision. (f) Make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved
party for the damage or loss caused by his or her offense in an amount to be determined
by the court. The court shall make such reparation or restitution a condition of probation,
unless it determines that clear and compelling reasons exist to the contrary. If the court
does not order restitution, or orders restitution of only a portion of the damages, as
provided in s. 775.089, it shall state on the record in detail the reasons therefore. (g)
Effective July 1, 1994, and applicable for offenses committed on or after that date, make
payment of the debt due and owing to a county or municipal detention facility under s.
951.032 for medical care, treatment, hospitalization, or transportation received by the
felony probationer while in that detention facility. The court, in determining whether to
order such repayment and the amount of the repayment, shall consider the amount of
the debt, whether there was any fault of the institution for the medical expenses
incurred, the financial resources of the felony probationer, the present and potential
future financial needs and earning ability of the probationer, and dependents, and other
appropriate factors. (h) Support his or her legal dependents to the best of his or her
ability. (i) Make payment of the debt due and owing to the state under s. 960.17, subject
to modification based on change of circumstances. (j) Pay any application fee assessed
under s. 27.52(1)(b) and attorney’s fees and costs assessed under s. 938.29, subject to
modification based on change of circumstances. (k) Not associate with persons engaged
in criminal activities. (l) 1. Submit to random testing as directed by the probation officer
or the professional staff of the treatment center where he or she is receiving treatment
to determine the presence or use of alcohol or controlled substances. 2. If the offense was
a controlled substance violation and the period of probation immediately follows a period
of incarceration in the state correctional system, the conditions must include a
requirement that the offender submit to random substance abuse testing intermittently
throughout the term of supervision, upon the direction of the probation officer.” Id.
254 Media/Public Information: Florida Commission on Offender Review History, FLA.
COMM’N ON OFFENDER REV., https://www.fcor.state.fl.us/media.shtml [https://perma.cc/Q3N2-BJV4].
255 Id.
256 FLA. STAT. § 944.275(3)(f) (2017).
257 Facts About Florida’s Prisoners, PROJECT 180, https://www.project180reentry.org/
statistics [https://perma.cc/XV8K-F8FX] (citing Agency Annual Report 2013-2014, FLA. DEP’T
CORRECTIONS (2015), http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/annual/1314/AnnualReport-1314.pdf); E.
Ann Carson, Prisoners In 2014, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 8 (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/p14.pdf [https://perma.cc/5G5C-JBVJ]; see also Lauren E. Glaze & Danielle Kaeble
Correctional Populations in the United States, 2013, BUREAU JUST. STAT. (Dec. 19, 2014), http://
www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=5177 [https://perma.cc/5YLX-BHB7].
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948.10 prohibits the DOC from giving officers more than twentyfive “community control” or “house-arrest” cases.258
As of December 2015, Florida had 225,400 citizens on
probation, parole or supervised release.259 The recidivism rate for 2012
(the most recent year surveyed) was twenty-five percent.260 As of 2014,
the successful program completion rate was 56.4%.261 The cost of
Florida incarceration is $53.49 per day (in fiscal year 2015).262
Supervised release costs the state $5.05 per day (or $1843 per year).263
F.

Overview of Conditions Associated with Parole and
Probation

As the above survey shows, probation and parole are widely
utilized sanctions throughout the United States. There is
widespread uniformity regarding the conditions that are placed on
offenders undergoing these sanctions. The cardinal condition that
is imposed on all offenders during the period of probation and
parole is that they cannot commit an offense during the period of
the order. The numerous other core or optional conditions that are
associated with these sanctions, such as not taking illicit drugs, are
principally designed to increase the likelihood of offenders not
committing other offenses during this period. Thus, a key objective
of the sanctions is community protection. A number of other
conditions that are often imposed as part of probation and parole
aim at rehabilitating offenders. These conditions too are designed
to protect that community from criminal behavior. Despite this, a
large number of probation and parole orders result in a default.
This varies considerably across each of the jurisdictions, however,
but is generally in the order of thirty percent and in some instances
is over forty percent.264 This means that offenders commit
hundreds of thousands of crimes in the community while
undergoing sentence.
There are numerous reasons why probation and parole are
ineffective at preventing reoffending during the period of the
sanctions. The key reason is that the level of oversight and
observation of offenders during this period is negligible. Offenders
258 WTSP Staff, DOC Skirts Law, Risks Safety on Probation Caseloads, WTSP
(Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.wtsp.com/news/investigations/doc-skirts-law-risks-safety-on
-probation-caseloads/236703183 [https://perma.cc/5REB-EQCQ].
259 KAEBLE & BONCZAR, supra note 199.
260 Quick Facts About the Florida Department of Corrections, FLA. DEP’T CORRECTIONS
(revised Dec. 2017), http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/Quickfacts.html.
261 Agency Annual Report 2013-2014, supra note 257, at 51.
262 Quick Facts About the Florida Department of Corrections, supra note 260.
263 Id.
264 KAEBLE & BONCZAR, supra note 199; see also Too big to succeed, supra note 23.
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are essentially at large in the community and have no meaningful
oversight of their movements and actions. In short, they have an
unrestricted level of opportunity to commit crime. In addition to
this, the conditions that are imposed in an attempt to decrease
the likelihood of reoffending are not effective. This to some extent
may be attributable to insufficient resources being devoted to
implementing these sanctions. The cost of probation and parole
vary considerably, however, they generally are in the order of oneeighth that of prison.265 Despite this, there is considerable
criticism of the level of resourcing provided in relation to these
sanctions, including the number of staff that are employed to
monitor offenders placed on probation and parole.266
Moreover, and importantly for the purposes of this
Article, the true cost of probation and parole is not reflected by
the cost compared to the cost of imprisonment. This is because,
as we have seen, there is a very high breach rate of these
sanctions, which often involves offenders being sentenced to
imprisonment.267 Thus, the breach rate of the sanctions is a
cardinal consideration in evaluating the financial viability of
parole and probation.
The reality is that even if the parole and probation
sanctions were better resourced, the rate of reoffending during
the term of the sanction is unlikely to improve meaningfully.
This is because an intrinsic aspect of the sanction is that it
involves no meaningful oversight by corrections staff. Offenders
who are on probation and parole receive a negligible amount of
direct supervision by a corrections officer and have an unlimited
capacity to plan and engage in criminal conduct. The nominal
level of oversight of these sanctions is a fundamental and
defining flaw of these sanctions. By their very nature, they will
always involve a large amount of crime being committed by
offenders who are placed on them. In the next part of the article,
we set out the contours of a sanction which would far more
effectively achieve the goals of probation and parole.

265 Supervision Costs Significantly Less than Incarceration in Federal System,
U.S. COURTS.GOV (July 18, 2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2013/07/18/supervisioncosts-significantly-less-incarceration-federal-system [https://perma.cc/9BCU-N4PY].
266 See, e.g., Too Big to Succeed: The Impact of the Growth of Community
Corrections and What Should Be Done About It, COLUM. U. JUST. LAB 1 (Jan. 29, 2018),
https://justicelab.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/Too_Big_to_Succeed_Report_F
INAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/6EXE-7PRG].
267 See supra Part III.
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PROPOSED NEW SANCTION—THE “MONITORING
SANCTION”

Probation and parole in the form that they are currently
imposed in are archaic, rudimentary processes that are incapable
of achieving their ultimate objective of sentencing (community
protection) to a satisfactory level. Offenders spend very little time
with their supervising corrections officer and hence have an
ample, unimpeded, opportunity to commit further crimes.268
These sanctions also sometimes have a rehabilitative aim, but the
level of resources devoted to this objective is minimal. Technology
promises to provide a far more effective and efficient means of
achieving the aims of probation and probation.
A.

Objective of the New Sanction

As we saw in Part II, the most important aim of sentencing
is protection of the community.269 Sentencing should also aim to
rehabilitate offenders, if possible. It should also impose a
punishment commensurate with the severity of the crime.
These objectives are consistent with the aim of probation
and parole; hence, one of the main points of attraction regarding
the new proposed sanction is that it can replace parole and
probation, while at the same time promoting the aims of
sentencing in general. In broad terms, the objective of the new
sanction is to provide a means for courts to impose punishment
on offenders who have committed mid-level and minor offenses
which does not involve the offender spending any time in prison
and to punish serious offenders who have completed part of their
prison term. The new sanction would replace probation and
parole in a manner which would ensure that all of the
appropriate sentencing objectives for this cohort of offenders are
satisfied in a far more efficient and effective manner that is
currently the situation.
There is one additional significant advantage of the new
sanction, which distinguishes it from all other criminal sanctions.
As noted above, the theory of marginal general deterrence is
flawed because there is no meaningful link between higher
penalties and lower crime.270 But absolute general deterrence does
work: there is a connection between the likelihood of being
apprehended and punished for a crime and lower recidivism.271
268
269
270
271

See supra Part III.
See supra INTRODUCTION.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
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Absolute general deterrence cannot normally be achieved by
criminal sanctions because by their nature they are reactionary
measures imposed by the criminal justice system after a crime
has been committed. Existing criminal sanctions do not operate
in a manner where they are designed or capable of effectively
monitoring the actions of offenders and thereby discouraging
offenders from committing further offenses.
By contrast, the new sanction would also facilitate the
goal of absolute general deterrence. The new sanction involves
monitoring and evaluating all of the actions of offenders. This
mechanism also provides a record of the actions of offenders,
which the police can use to detect the commission of a crime and
by prosecutors as evidence of the crime. This provides a powerful
reason for offenders who are undergoing the sanction to not
commit further offenses. Thus, the subsidiary aim of the
sanctions is to enable the efficient detection, arrest and
prosecution of offenders who do commit offenses while they are
subject to the sanction.
B.

Overview of the New Sanction

More than forty years ago, criminologist Robert
Martinson, in response to the high rate of offender recidivism,
suggested the most effective way to protect the community from
criminals was to assign a police officer to each offender. He
dubbed this “cop-a-con.”272 The proposal was never implemented
or even trialed, presumably because of the prohibitive cost. But
technology now exists, which if adapted to the development and
implementation of criminal sanctions can achieve a very similar
level of monitoring and supervision, at a fraction of the cost.
Moreover, the technological approach we advocate is in many
respects even more foolproof than the detection and surveillance
prowess of police.
The gold standard in achieving these aims is to have
every movement of offenders monitored in real time for the
entire duration of the sanction. This was the rationale behind
Martinson’s “cop-a-con” proposal.273 It is not feasible to have this
monitoring undertaken by human beings, given the labor
intensive (and hence expensive) nature of the activity. Moreover,

272 Lee Wohlfert, Criminologist Bob Martinson Offers a Crime-Stopper: Put a
Cop on Each Ex-Con, PEOPLE (Feb. 23, 1976), http://people.com/archive/criminologistbob-martinson-offers-a-crime-stopper-put-a-cop-on-each-ex-con-vol-5-no-7
[https://perma.cc/58HE-DGYB].
273 Id.
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humans have concentration and other lapses and hence human
monitoring would have considerable limitations in any event.
Fortunately, computer technology is now at a point where
it is can efficiently and effectively monitor, record, and, most
importantly, evaluate all human behavior. The clearest example
of the implementation of this type of technology is its use in
driverless cars. As discussed below, sensor technology is already
in use in the health sector which enables the immediate
detection of untoward events, such as falls. The same type of
technology can be adapted and utilized to monitor and record
human movement.
The broad thrust of the proposed new sanction is that the
location of the offender would be ascertainable at every point in
time. In addition to this, every movement that an offender
makes would be monitored in real-time by sensor equipment. If
the movement involves suspicious activity, a camera is
automatically activated which enables a corrections officer to
gain a more accurate assessment of the relevant event.
Suspicious activities include fast movements which could
involve the application of force to another person or picking up
an implement which could be used as a weapon. The camera
would not be activated immediately on detection of the
suspicious movement. This is in order to acknowledge privacy
interests of the offender, and more importantly, people in close
proximity to the offender. Thus, if a suspicious movement occurs,
an audio alarm would trigger, which would raise awareness to
the offender and people in his or her vicinity that visual
monitoring may occur within a short period of time—say one
minute. We now discuss the technology that can be used to
develop the sanction.
C.

The Technological Aspects of the Sanction
1. Electronic Monitoring of Offenders’ Locations

The most established aspect of our technological
monitoring proposal is the use of radio frequency or Global
Positioning System (GPS) monitoring.274 At present,
274 See Mike Nellis, Electronic Monitoring: Exploring the Commercial Dimension, 58
CRIM. JUST. MATTERS 12, 12 (2008), https://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/sites/crimeandjustice.
org.uk/files/09627250408553235.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZC4D-YVZR]; MATTHEW DEMICHELE &
BRIAN PAYNE, OFFENDER SUPERVISION WITH ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY: COMMUNITY
CORRECTIONS RESOURCE 10–12, 14, 16–17, 19-20 (2d ed. 2009), https://www.appa-net.org/
eweb/docs/APPA/pubs/OSET_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/QN75-RPWX]. For a summary of its
introduction and use in the United States, see Lars H. Andersen & Signe H. Andersen, Effect of
Electronic Monitoring on Social Welfare Dependence, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 349, 350–
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approximately 125,000 inmates are subject to electronic
monitoring.275 Although this is a significant number of prisoners,
given the size of U.S. prisons, this is still a relatively untested
and unfamiliar area of criminal justice reform. The Pew Trust
noted that:
Despite the substantial growth of electronic tracking during the study
period, it remains relatively rare in the context of the U.S. corrections
system. Nationally, nearly [seven] million people were in prison or jail
or on probation or parole at the end of 2014, but individuals tracked
using electronic devices in 2015 represented less than [two] percent of
that total. Although some research suggests that electronic
monitoring can help reduce reoffending rates, the expanded use of
these technologies has occurred largely in the absence of data
demonstrating their effectiveness for various types of offenders at
different stages of the criminal justice process.276

There are no universal criteria for how a prisoner in the United States
can receive electronic monitoring but generally, it is only for offenders
who have not committed a serious violent or sexual offense.277
Electronic monitoring works by fixing a transmitter to the
offender which then sends a pulse to the local authorities, allowing
them to monitor his or her position.278 GPS and radio frequency
(RF) are both used to track the offender and trigger an alert when
offenders leave their designated areas.279 A step outside of these
bounds alerts the authorities and the offender. GPS is by far the
more common form of monitoring.280 As of 2015, approximately
eighty-eight thousand GPS units were in use, a thirty-fold increase
in the past decade.281 By contrast, the number of RF units used fell
52 (2014); see also Matthew DeMichele, Electronic Monitoring: It Is a Tool, Not a Silver Bullet,
13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 393, 395–97 (2014); Brian K. Payne, It’s A Small World, but I
Wouldn’t Want to Paint it: Learning from Denmark’s Experience with Electronic Monitoring, 13
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 381, 382–83 (2014); Mike Nellis, Surveillance and Confinement:
Explaining and Understanding the Experience of Electronically Monitored Curfews, 1 EUR. J.
PROB. 41, 41 (2009).
275 This number has grown from 53,000 in 2005. Use of Electronic Offender-Tracking
Devices Expands Sharply, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. 1 (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2016/10/use_of_electronic_offender_tracking_devices_expands_sharply.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NA6E-JJCC] [hereinafter Electronic Tracking Devices].
276 Id. at 3.
277 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.734 (2018); Electronic Monitoring
Program for DUI Offenders, OKLA. DEP’T CORR. (2014), http://doc.ok.gov/Websites/doc/
Images/Documents/Policy/op061002.pdf [https://perma.cc/44QY-BWDG] Juliet Lapidos,
You’re Grounded! How Do You Qualify for House Arrest?, SLATE (Jan. 28, 2009),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2009/01/youre_grounded.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/ZV5P-TL3E];. Brandon Martin & Ryken Grattet, Alternatives to
Incarceration in California, PUB. POL’Y INST. CAL. (Apr. 2015), http://www.ppic.org/main/
publication_quick.asp?i=1146 [https://perma.cc/P749-4FHD].
278 Electronic Tracking Devices, supra note 275, at 2.
279 Id.
280 Id. at 2–3.
281 Id. at 3.
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from approximately fifty thousand to thirty-eight thousand over
the same period.282 This change in usage is likely due to the greater
capabilities of GPS, benefits which include the ability to track an
offender’s movements in real time.283
These tracking devices are typically fitted into ankle
bracelets and charged by a twenty-four-hour battery. Monitors
consist of a hard plastic shell containing a GPS chip and a fiberoptic cable, and are affixed to the offender’s ankle with a rubber
strap.284 Any attempt to tamper with or remove the bracelet
would result in a notification sent to the local enforcement
authorities monitoring the device.285
Tracking bracelets are six to ten times less expensive
than typical imprisonment of offenders.286 The benefits of GPS
monitoring are not merely confined to direct cost savings
compared to prison—several studies have shown that the
reduction in recidivism levels of offenders through electronic
monitoring is between around twenty percent and fifty percent,
far lower than the rates of imprisonment.287
Id.
Id. at 2–3.
284 See Mark Morri, New Electronic Anklets a Tougher Collar for Prisoners,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/newelectronic-anklets-a-tougher-collar-for-prisoners/news-story/c2e00e5356bbf7a8e7596d
4285df4971 [https://perma.cc/N22D-GVGZ]; Rob Walker, Reconsidering the Ankle
Monitor: Contemplating the Criminal Justice Tool’s Role in the Rehabilitation Process
amid the Wearable Tech Boom, GOOD (Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.good.is/features/issue35-ankle-monitors [https://perma.cc/FC7G-2R3F].
285 Morri, supra note 284; Walker, supra note 284.
286 Barry Latzer, Let Them Wear Bracelets, NAT’L REV, https://www.national
review.com/magazine/2018/03/19/criminal-justice-reform-electronic-monitoring-future/
[https://perma.cc/3BA5-DLU2]. A review in 2006 of the electronic monitoring of offenders found
that the cost is about one-fifth that of imprisonment and “robust” in detecting violations of the
term of the order. See The Electronic Monitoring of Adult Offenders, NAT’L AUDIT OFF. (Feb. 1,
2006), http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0506/the_electronic_monitoring_of_a.aspx [https://
perma.cc/7L73-L9WA]; see also Natasha Alladina, The Use of Electronic Monitoring in the
Alaska Criminal Justice System: A Practical Yet Incomplete Alternative to Incarceration, 28
ALASKA L. REV. 125, 144 (2011); OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE., NCJ 234460,
ELECTRONIC MONITORING REDUCES RECIDIVISM 1 (2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
234460.pdf [https://perma.cc/VTD6-6Z7U].
287 ELECTRONIC MONITORING REDUCES RECIDIVISM, supra note 286, at 2; see also
RAFAEL DI TELLA & ERNESTO SCHARGRODSKY, CRIMINAL RECIDIVISM AFTER PRISON AND
ELECTRONIC MONITORING 69 (2013); F. Marklund & S. Holmberg, Effects of Early Release
from Prison Using Electronic Tagging in Sweden, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 41, 53,
59 (2009); Stuart S. Yeh, The Electronic Monitoring Paradigm: A Proposal for Transforming
Criminal Justice in the USA, 4 LAWS 60, 64 (2015); WILLIAM BALES ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, A QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING 58,
64 (2010), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/230530.pdf [https://perma.cc/BL3ZP8BR]; STEPHEN V. GIES ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MONITORING HIGH-RISK SEX
OFFENDERS WITH GPS TECHNOLOGY: AN EVALUATION OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPERVISION
PROGRAM, FINAL REPORT 3–15 (2012), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/238481.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9JD8-D2XA]; JOHN K. ROMAN ET AL., D.C. CRIME POL’Y INST., THE COSTS
AND BENEFITS OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING FOR WASHINGTON, D.C., 3, 6 (2012), https://
282
283
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GPS, however, is not infallible. While it is practically
impossible for the offender to cut the bracelet without setting off
the alarm,288 sub-standard monitoring by law enforcement has
resulted in triggered alarms with inadequate responses.289 This
limitation, however, is human rather than technological, and
outcomes can be improved simply by allocating more resources
to police departments and other departments who monitor these
devices. The second limitation of electronic monitoring is that
offenders can still harm people within their assigned physical
boundaries.290 This shortcoming stems from the fact that
electronic tracking does not involve monitoring the actions
which are performed by people. It is this limitation of the GPS
tracking that we seek to address with monitoring of an offender’s
behavior, and in the next section we discuss how technology can
be adapted and implemented to meet this aim.
2. Computer Surveillance of Offenders’ Actions
Aside from monitoring offender’s location, we propose live
monitoring of an offender’s actions. The technology now exists to
monitor, in real-time, whether an offender is behaving in a
criminal, aggressive, threatening, or problematic way. By using
artificial intelligence-based monitoring of offender’s behavior,
we believe that we can deter offenders from committing a crime,
and detect the commission of the offenses should offenders
decide to re-offend during the period of the sanction.
An old-fashioned way of monitoring offender’s actions
would be to confine them to one location, overseen by closed-circuit
televisions in offenders’ residences and employing people to watch
the footage from several residences on two or three screens
simultaneously. This surveillance, however, is impractical for a
range of reasons, most notably because it is unrealistic to confine
an offender to a small number of locations, and it would be
prohibitively expensive to hire correctional officers to monitor
millions of prisoners in real time in numerous environments in any
www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/412678-The-Costs-and-Benefitsof-Electronic-Monitoring-for-Washington-D-C-.PDF [https://perma.cc/5FE9-VNXF].
288 Eric Markowitz, Why GPS Doesn’t Always Work for Tracking Convicts,
VOCATIV (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.vocativ.com/underworld/crime/gps-doesnt-alwayswork-tracking-convicts [https://perma.cc/CM9S-2ZTK].
289 See Associated Press, Analysis Finds not Enough Monitoring of Monitoring
Bracelets in US, FOX NEWS (July 28, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2013/07/28/analysisfinds-not-enough-monitoring-monitoring-bracelets-in-us.html [https://perma.cc/EL85-XC4Z].
290 See Markowitz, supra note 288. Nevertheless, studies show that offenders
who are subject to house arrest and are electronically monitored are 94.7% less likely to
commit an offense than those that are not monitored. Yeh, supra note 287, at 64.
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event. More than this, human monitoring is laborious, difficult,
and prone to human error.291 As Georgakopoulos et al. notes:
Video surveillance solutions relying on human operators require
humans to try to discover occurrences of complex events by
continuously reasoning about patterns of simple video events
distributed in time and possibly occurring in different locations in a
facility. This is very hard to do and is impossible for humans to sustain
even for a modest period of time (e.g., a few hours).292

A more cost-effective, efficient, and reliable alternative is
to use recent advances in signal processing and artificial
intelligence to perform constant, automated processing of the
actions of all offenders. The key to the new sanction is utilizing
and adapting current developments in sensor technology and in
machine learning algorithms.
Sensors now exist that can detect all human movement
and simultaneously monitor the geographical whereabouts of
people wearing the sensors. This can be readily completed by
equipment that can visually and aurally record the actions of the
person. Machine learning systems then analyze the sensor data
to detect anomalous, dangerous, or criminal behavior. In broad
terms, the technology can detect suspicious movement, and if
this occurred, an alarm would be activated notifying the offender
that within a short period of time his or her actions would be
visually observed. The data from the technology, even prior to
the activation of an alarm would always be stored to record the
actions and location of the offender. Moreover, the sensor can be
made tamperproof so that it cannot be removed by an offender
(similarly to the technology described above for electronic ankle
bracelet monitors). If an attempt is made to remove the bracelet,
an alarm is triggered, and police would be notified to the last
location of the offender.
The system that would implement constant monitoring
relies on three main technical requirements: a mandatory body
sensor harness worn by all offenders, a stable and secure
communication system, and a remote, machine-learning based
signal processing system that can recognize suspicious behavior.
The first requirement is a sensor harness that can capture
video and audio signals from an offender’s environment.293 These
291 M. Sivarathinabala & S. Abirami, An Intelligent Video Surveillance Framework
for Remote Monitoring, 2 INT’L J. ENG’G. SCI. & INNOVATIVE. TECH. 297, 297 (2013).
292 Dimitrios Georgakopoulos et al., Event-driven Video Awareness Providing
Physical Security, 10 WORLD WIDE WEB J. 86, 86 (2007).
293 For the sake of simplicity, we call this a “sensor harness” throughout this Article,
but as cameras and sensors decrease in the size, the harness will probably end up being the size
of a matchbox, and able to be clipped to the upper part of the prisoners’ clothing. Already police
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types of units are already being produced in the form of body
cameras that police departments are introducing across the United
States in order to lower complaints, provide evidence where police
officers’ use of force results in fatalities, and improve the
transparency and accountability of police officers’ activities.294
Although these systems have come under various types of
criticism, there are now a variety of sophisticated and customizable
body cameras on the market, and their efficacy is extremely high.
Some of these cameras have night vision, built-in flashlights,
twelve-hour batteries,295 high definition video recording that
incorporates date and time information into recorded footage,
capacity to restrict access to the footage to designated computers,
GPS technology, and 150 degree fields of view.296 They are durable,
fire-resistant, water-proof, and light-weight.297 Current models cost
between $300-$800, depending on the specifications and
manufacturers, and this figure is certain to drop as the technology
becomes ubiquitous.298
Offenders would be required to change the batteries in the
sensor harness regularly and to wear them on their clothing at all
times, and offenders would also need to wear the sensors while
bathing. They would be forbidden from removing the sensors
body cameras that include high definition video, dual audio channels, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth
connection, and a 12-hour battery are the size of a pack of playing cards. See Axon Body 2, AXON
AU, https://au.axon.com/products/body-2 [https://perma.cc/RFS6-DDX9].
294 See Dana Goodyear, Can the Manufacturer of Tasers Provide the Answer to Police
Abuse?, NEW YORKER (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/08/27/canthe-manufacturer-of-tasers-provide-the-answer-to-police-abuse [https://perma.cc/6MVT-SWG2]
; Damien Gayle, Police with Body Cameras Receive 93% Fewer Complaints – Study, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/sep/29/police-with-body-camerasreceive-93-fewer-complaints-study [https://perma.cc/99RC-W528]; Danny Shaw, Police Body
Cameras ‘Cut Complaints Against Officers,’ BBC NEWS (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/
news/uk-37502136 [https://perma.cc/PS4D-HQ3M]; Robinson Meyer, Body Cameras Are
Betraying Their Promise, ATLANTIC (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2016/09/body-cameras-are-just-making-police-departments-more-powerful/502421
[https://perma.cc/7WN8-4J7C].
295 Bodycam: Body-Worn Cameras, BODYCAMERAS.COM, https://bodycameras.com/
[https://perma.cc/CNX3-NW7V] [hereinafter Bodycam by Provision]. As noted below this is a
limitation of the sanction and needs to be addressed before the sanction is widely implemented.
See infra Part V.
296 Body Cameras, In-Car Video & Evidence Management Solutions, WOLFCOM,
https://wolfcomusa.com/ [https://perma.cc/MGU9-XW57] [hereinafter Wolfcom Body Cameras];
Bodycam by Provision, supra note 295.
297 See, e.g., Wolfcom Body Cameras, supra note 296; Bodycam by Provision, supra
note 295; REVEAL, https://www.revealmedia.com/products/d-series [https://perma.cc/9PATW9Q9]; AXON, supra note 293.
298 Eric Markowitz, Police Departments Face a Crucial Question: How to Pay
For Body Cameras?, INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 12, 2016), http://www.ibtimes.com/policedepartments-face-crucial-question-how-pay-body-cameras-2366968 [https://perma.cc/B3
N4-QCJF]; Alfred Ng, How Police Body Cameras Became a Budget Battlefield, CNET
(Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.cnet.com/au/news/nypd-body-camera-police-justice-vievutaser [https://perma.cc/Z3EH-P9TN].
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during the period of the sanction. An obvious concern is that an
offender might attach the sensors to someone else in an effort to
thwart the monitoring. This difficulty, however, can be easily
overcome by having an upward facing camera within the sensor
harness that undertakes constant facial recognition of the
prisoner to ensure compliance. A combination of thermal and
visual cameras has been shown to generate reliable identification
in over ninety-eighty percent of cases.299
The second requirement of this part of our proposal is a
reliable and secure communication infrastructure that would allow
transmission of video and audio streams to a remote location. This
is a necessary feature of the new sanction, because sensor
processing technology is currently too intensive for it to be able to
be done on the sensor unit. For the next decade it is likely the signal
processing of the video and audio activity would have to happen at
remote computing facilities, potentially distant from the prisoner’s
location. Of course, in an era of 4G—soon 5G—mobile
telecommunication infrastructure, together with widespread
broadband, most of the United States would be covered.
Finally, the transmitted video and audio stream would
need to be analyzed by a remote signal processing architecture.
This system would analyze the signals in real time and trigger
an alarm in the event that offenders are attempting to commit
crimes or engaging in unauthorized activity, or where their
sensor harnesses have been deactivated or removed. This is the
most technologically sophisticated requirement of our proposal.
Nonetheless, it is perfectly feasible these days. The recent
publicity surrounding self-driving cars provides ample evidence
of the strides that have been made in real-time sensor analysis
using machine learning algorithms. Self-driving cars rely on a
range of environmental sensors—typically ultrasonic sonar,
lidar, and radar arrays300—together with a neural networkbased signals processing system, to drive a car more safely than
human beings.301 This feat is something that, a few years ago,
299 Diego A. Socolinsky & Andrea Selinger, Thermal Face Recognition in an
Operational Scenario (2004) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/
u2/a451507.pdf [https://perma.cc/VU23-M9DJ]; see Sachin Sudhakar Farfade et al., Multiview Face Detection Using Deep Convolutional Neural Networks, (Apr. 20, 2015), https://
arxiv.org/pdf/1502.02766v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/CGA8-2VMX].
300 See Bryan Clark, How Self-Driving Cars Work: The Nuts and Bolts Behind Google’s
Autonomous Car Program, MAKE USE OF (Feb. 21, 2015), http://www.makeuseof.com/tag/howself-driving-cars-work-the-nuts-and-bolts-behind-googles-autonomous-car-program [https://per
ma.cc/3RXE-ALWK]; Ryan Bradley, Tesla Autopilot, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar./Apr. 2016), https://
www.technologyreview.com/s/600772/10-breakthrough-technologies-2016-tesla-autopilot
[https://perma.cc/AD6Z-WYAU].
301 Clark, supra note 300.
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was seen as a virtually impossible task, and one that was
thought would take decades to achieve.302
We are now at the same inflection point in a range of signals
processing fields that can be applied to technological incarceration.
As long ago as ten years ago, Georgakopoulos et al. showed that a
computer system could monitor and analyze in real time footage of
human motion that is captured on video surveillance cameras
within offices and workplaces, and detect automatically any
suspicious events.303 This system looked for abnormal actions of
multiple people—that is, where they diverge from typical
movements, such as by fighting, wobbling around, moving their
arms, hitting, falling over, running, punching, kicking, shaking
their heads to both sides, and revolving side-by-side or back-toback304 The system is trained on large datasets of prior examples,
and establishes a baseline of acceptable behavior. Any behavior
that falls outside of this baseline would trigger an exception to alert
human operators of the system. It can send to the human operators
to view a record of the sequence, in which the detected behavior
occurred, including the date and time it took place.305
Current machine learning systems are even more precise
in determining unauthorized or problematic behaviors,306 and
can be used to monitor larger areas with ease.307 There is even
now an industry standard, called Open Network Video Interface
Forum (ONVIF), to provide for integration of processing systems
for the creation of wide-area surveillance systems.308 These
302 For a simple and accessible overview of artificial intelligence, and especially the
modern advances in convolutional and multi-layer/deep neural networks, along with their
social significance, see Gideon Lewis-Kraus, The Great A.I. Awakening, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Dec. 14, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/magazine/the-great-ai-awakening.html
[https://perma.cc/2W38-YF9B].
303 Georgakopoulos et al., supra note 292; Enrique Bermejo et al., Security
System Based on Suspicious Behavior Detection, 25 BURAN 12 (2010); Sivarathinabala &
Abirami, supra note 291, at 297–98; Syed Ahmar Qamar et al., A Supervisory System to
Detect Suspicious Behavior in Online Testing System, 3 IPCSIT 397 (2011).
304 Bermejo et al., supra note 303, at 13; Sivarathinabala & Abirami, supra note
291, at 297-98, 300; Qamar et al., supra note 303, at 397–98.
305 Georgakopoulos et al., supra note 292; Bermejo et al., supra note 303, at 12–
15; Sivarathinabala & Abirami, supra note 291, at 297–98, 300.
306 Esra Acar et al., Human Action Recognition Using Lagrangian Descriptors,
IEEE INT’L WORKSHOP ON MULTIMEDIA SIGNAL PROCESSING (2012); Bermejo et al., supra
note 303, at 14–15; Alexander Kuhn et al., A Lagrangian Framework for Video Analytics,
IEEE WORKSHOP ON MULTIMEDIA SIGNAL PROCESSING (2012).
307 Tobias Senst et al., On Building Decentralized Wide-Area Surveillance
Networks based on ONVIF, 8TH IEEE INT’L CONFERENCE ON ADVANCED VIDEO AND
SIGNAL BASED SURVEILLANCE (2011), http://elvera.nue.tu-berlin.de/files/1313Senst2011.
pdf [https://perma.cc/4DYG-3N3F].
308 See ONVIF, http://www.onvif.org [https://perma.cc/3ACX-AWCG]; see also
Johanna P. Carvajal-Gonzalez et al., Silhouette classification by using manifold learning
for automated threat detection, 47th INTERNATIONAL CARNAHAN CONFERENCE ON
SECURITY TECHNOLOGY (ICCST), at 1–5 (2013).
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algorithms can now process signals from multiple sources—
including video, audio, alarms, and satellite positioning
systems—to assess behavior of the surveilled place or
individual.309 Recent advances in speech recognition have
improved to the point where commercially available systems like
Siri, Cortana, Facebook M, Google Assistant, and Alexa are used
by millions of people a day, and the technology for
comprehension of voice and audio continues apace, allowing for
the monitoring of the speech of the offender.310 And, finally, deepneural networks now have the capacity to recognize the
emotional state of a person speaking from the stress factors
present in his/her voice, and are making great strides in reading
the feelings of people from faces presented to them.311
When one connects all of these advances, it is clear that it
is possible to conduct real-time, automatic analysis of the behavior
of offenders, and of those who come within their environment. It is
now feasible to develop a system that can determine whether an
offender is having a psychotic episode (from speech recognition and
audio processing of emotional states), is threatening another
person (from audio processing of emotional states of all within the
room, and video processing of the prisoner’s behavior), or is seeking
to leave a designated zone (from GPS tracking). And so we now
stand at the point where the automatic, technological monitoring
of all offenders is possible.
The likely benefits of this technology are two-fold. First, all
offenders would be aware that their actions and whereabouts can
be constantly and continually monitored. The theory of absolute
general deterrence means that this makes it very unlikely that
offenders would commit offenses in these circumstances. As we
have seen, the greatest deterrent to crime is the realization by
individuals that if they offend, they would then be detected and

309 Richard Adderley et al., MOSAIC: A Multi-modal Surveillance System to
Enhance Situation Awareness and Decision Making, in HCI INTERNATIONAL 2014 - POSTERS’
EXTENDED ABSTRACTS (Constantine Stephandis ed. 2014). COMMUNICATIONS IN COMPUTER
AND INFORMATION SCIENCE, VOL 434 (2014); Dragos Datcu & L.J. Rothkrantz, A Multimodal
Workbench for Automatic Surveillance, IEEE CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER VISION & PATTERN
RECOGNITION (2004).
310 See generally Ossama Abdel-Hamid et al., Convolutional Neural Networks for
Speech Recognition, 22 IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON AUDIO, SPEECH & LANG. PROC. (2014).
311 Iulia Lefter et al., Recognizing Stress Using Semantics and Modulation of Speech
and Gestures, 7 IEEE TRANS. ON AFFECTIVE COMPUTING 162-75 (2016); Iulia Lefter et al.,
Emotion Recognition from Speech by Combining Databases and Fusion of Classifiers, in TEXT,
SPEECH AND DIALOGUE (Petr Sojka et al., eds. 2010);); see Wojtek Zajdel et al., CASSANDRA:
audio-video sensor fusion for aggression detection, 2007 IEEE CONFERENCE ON ADVANCED
VIDEO AND SIGNAL BASED SURVEILLANCE, AVSS, 200–05 (2007); Iulia Lefter et al., Crosscorpus analysis for acoustic recognition of negative interactions, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON AFFECTIVE COMPUTING AND INTELLIGENT INTERACTION (ACII) 2015, 132-38 (2015).
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punished.312 Offenders who perform harmful acts would be detected
as they perform the crime. The tracking of their location,
identification of their movements and video surveillance of their
conduct would provide powerful evidence of their crimes and
awareness of this would provide the strongest possible
discouragement against criminal behavior. This is the reason that
so little overt crime is committed in locations where offenders are
aware that they may be detected, such as at police stations and
airports. For the relatively few offenders that do commit offenses
while subjected to the monitoring sanction, it is likely that they
would be detected and apprehended in a short period of time.
Of course, this analysis most strongly applies to crimes
which involve the offender engaging in conduct that is likely to be
detected as being suspicious by the sensor system. Crimes which
are committed through innocuous behavior, such as fraud
committed over the internet would not be detected by the sensors.
Offenders would still be strongly discouraged from committing
such crime, however, because the monitoring system would keep
track of their exact location and actions at all times and hence
make it easy for police to gather, at least circumstantial evidence,
of their actions once the crime was reported and if they were
identified as a suspect. The other significant advantage of the
monitoring sanctions, as is discussed further below is that it is
likely to be considerably financially cheaper than the current cost
of probation and parole.
An important feature of the monitoring sanction is its
flexibility and capacity to be adopted to different offenses according
to their severity and an offender’s risk profile. Thus, for less serious
offenses, the sanction can be adopted to enable offenders to move
around freely in the community with little restrictions (apart from,
for example, in exclusion zones such as bars and restaurants) and
few restricted movements, thus offenders would be permitted to
pick up implements, which could be potentially used as weapons.
For offenders who have committed more serious offenses, the
sanctions could be applied far more strictly and hence, for example,
they could be confined to their residence and precluded from
picking up all but pre-tagged implements, such as certain pens and
cutlery, and prohibited from all quick movements, such as running.
V.

LIKELY CRITICISMS OF REFORM PROPOSALS

Technology already exists which can adapt to develop and
implement the proposed monitoring sanction. There are likely to be
312

See supra Part II.
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a number of criticisms, however, relating to its use. We now address
the most likely criticisms and set out why none of them provide a
persuasive reason against the implementation of the sanction.
A.

Lack of Privacy

One of the main criticisms of the proposed new sanction
is likely to be that it would violate the privacy of offenders.
Privacy is a controversial right. The definition and justification
of the right is unclear. Robert Post has lamented that “[p]rivacy
is a value so complex, so entangled in competing and
contradictory dimensions, so engorged with various and distinct
meanings, that I sometimes despair whether it can be usefully
addressed at all.”313 Perhaps the most enlightening definition of
privacy is simply “the right to be let alone.”314 The rationale for
privacy is generally thought to stem from the broader virtues of
autonomy and dignity.315
Despite doctrinal uncertainty regarding the nature and
source of the right to privacy, the Supreme Court has acknowledged
it as a legally protected interest. The right to privacy (so far as
personal autonomy is concerned) has been mainly acknowledged in
contexts relating to procreation and family relationships.316 In Roe v.
Wade, for example, Justice Blackmun stated in his majority opinion:
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In
a line of decisions, however, . . . the Court has recognized that a right
of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy,
does exist under the Constitution. In varying contexts, the Court or
individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that right
in the First Amendment, in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, in the
penumbras of the Bill of Rights, in the Ninth Amendment, or in the
concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment.317

The right to privacy, however, is virtually negated in the
context of some criminal sanctions and in particular,
imprisonment—even when prisoners are in their cells. In
Hudson v. Palmer, the Court noted that it would not be possible
to achieve many of the security objectives of prisons, which

Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2087 (2001).
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 193 (1890).
315 VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, Workplace Privacy: Issues Paper 17 (2002), http://
www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/IssuesPaperfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JQ4-LEPC].
316 See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
317 Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (citations omitted).
313

314
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involve prohibiting the introduction of drugs and weapons into
prisons, if prisoners retained the right to privacy.318
Thus, while the right to privacy does receive some legal
recognition, it is a weak right, which is often impinged upon—
often without the need for a formal or established legal
justification. This is demonstrated by the massive intrusions
into privacy that have occurred over the past decade. CCTV
monitoring exists in many parts of America. A person who walks
the streets of Manhattan likely has their image taken hundreds
of times. Further, every keystroke that a person makes on their
computer can be monitored and it is possible to retrieve voice
and text messages sent by cell phone.
The violation of privacy stemming from the monitoring
sanction is limited. For most of the time, individuals would be
potentially observable, instead of being constantly observed or
monitored during the operation of the sanction. While
information about an offender’s location and actions would be
constantly monitored by computer censoring, this would
generally not extend to actual human observation. Actual visual
or other close observation of an offender’s actions would occur
only in two circumstances.
The first is when an offender breaches the limits of the
GPS boundary or engages in suspicious activity. In these
circumstances, visual monitoring of the offender’s actions would
be undertaken by a corrections staff member. The monitoring
would then continue unless is transpires that the sensor alarm
went off without due cause, for example, if the offender is
punching a boxing bag as opposed to another person. The second
is after the event, when it is suspected that the offender
committed a crime. In this context, if the video surveillance was
not activated at the time of the event, the available material
would be available on a computer data regarding, where the
offender was at a relevant time and the record from the sensors
regarding the movements that were made during the relevant
period. This could be closely scrutinized and provide police and
prosecutors valuable evidential material. This retrospective
information gathering exercise is in principle the same process
that now occurs when a person is convicted of a crime. The only
difference is that the sources of information that are currently
available are ad hoc.
318 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 517–18 (1984); see also Giano v. Goord, 9 F.
Supp. 2d 235 (W.D.N.Y. 1998), aff ’ d in part and vacated in part, 250 F.3d 146 (2d Cir. 2001),
vacated on other grounds, 380 F.3d 670 (2d Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Ross v.
Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016); Williams v. Kyler, 680 F. Supp. 172 (M.D. Pa. 1986).
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For example, if an offender robs a bank, police can
potentially collate data from a number and type of sources
including CCTV footage from the bank and surrounding streets,
witness testimony from staff working at the bank and
positioning data if the offender was carrying a cell phone. It is
incontestable that such evidence gathering does not breach
privacy limits. There are countless instances of crimes that have
been solved by police viewing CCTV footage of the event
(generally when the offender was unaware that the location was
being filmed) and the offender being identified after his or her
image was screened in the mainstream media. If an offender
burgles a house in a quiet location, however, then it may be the
case that no relevant evidence can be obtained against the
offender. The important point being that the incursion into the
right to privacy that would stem from the new sanction is no
different in nature to existing limitations of this right. To the
extent that the incursions are more sophisticated than is
currently the situation, this could be readily justified by the
common good that is achieved by reducing crime (due to the
principle of absolute general deterrence) and the increased rate
of detecting and prosecuting offenders.
It is acknowledged, however, that the extent of the
intrusion to privacy as it relates to the monitoring sanction can
potentially extend beyond the privacy interests of offenders.
Individuals who are in the immediate vicinity of the offender
could also be video recorded during any periods when the video
monitoring is activated. There are three reasons that this does
not present as a serious objection to the proposed sanction. First,
it is already commonplace for individuals to be subject to video
monitoring on a regular basis, as now increasingly is the case in
relation to urban locations. Secondly, video surveillance would
only activate in circumstances where the offender is acting
suspiciously. This would most typically be a situation where an
offender is acting in a harmful way to another person. In such
instances, the other person would almost certainly welcome the
intrusion into their privacy. Thirdly, it is people who are living
with the offender who are most likely to be captured during any
video observation of the offender. If the privacy concerns of these
people are regarded as being cardinal interests, a precondition
of an offender being subjected to the sanction is that those living
with him expressly consent to living with an offender who is
subjected to such monitoring. This is not likely to prove to be a
meaningful obstacle to the imposition of the new sanction. This
requirement is similar to that which currently exists in relation
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to home detention—prisoners are only eligible for it if those with
whom they live provide informed consent to the sanction, which
occurs in most cases.319
There remains the potentially sensitive issue of what
happens when offenders are involved in sexual activities with
others, and to this end, it is expressly acknowledged that the
proposed sanction limits an offender’s sexual autonomy to a greater
extent than parole or probation. Offenders who are the subject of the
monitoring sanction would not be prohibited from engaging in sex
but there is a risk that video surveillance could be triggered during
a sexual episode. This obviously could embarrass the offender and
the other person. The difficulty that this presents would be
minimized by the fact that before video monitoring of an offender’s
actions commence, an audio alarm would be activated. This would
begin thirty seconds before visual monitoring and could be
reinforced by an alarm fifteen seconds prior to visual monitoring,
which contains a pre-recorded message notifying the offenders and
others in the vicinity of the imminent nature of video recording.320
There are a number of other reasons why the privacy
interest of other people would not be meaningfully curtailed by
the monitoring sanction. A condition of being subjected to the
monitoring sanction should be that the offender expressly
informs prospective sexual partners that he or she is undergoing
the sanction and of the potential for video observation. Further,
offenders could eliminate the risk of this type of intrusion by
abstaining from sex for the duration of the sanction. To some
this might appear at first instance to be a considerable form of
deprivation but contextualized properly this is not the case. The
alternative to this sanction would in many cases be prison,
where there is a total ban on sexual relations and no opportunity
for intimacy with other people and hence relatively speaking
abstaining from sexual relations while still being able to have
share intimate moments with family and loved ones is a small
sacrifice to make. Thus, the right to privacy does not present an
overwhelming obstacle to the new sanction.
B.

Technological Failure

No technology is perfect. It is foreseeable that the new
sanction could fail at times. This is especially the case given that the
sanction depends on a technology, which has not yet been tested in
See, e.g., GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 61, at 458–59.
This concession would of course mean that offenders would effectively receive a
thirty second start in relation to any criminal acts, however, this “head start” remains a
considerable improvement compared to current parole and probation sanctions.
319

320
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the context of punishing and containing offenders. Given the novelty
of the proposals and the potential fallibility of any new technology or
system, the inevitable criticism that the monitoring sanction is not
foolproof should be dealt with by gradually implementing the
sanction. This would also ensure there is sufficient time for testing
and refining the required technology, and for the community to
accept and recognize the advantages of the new sanction.
Punishment and sentencing of offenders are not solely, and in fact
not mainly, rational processes. It is important that the new sanction
is implemented in a systematic and methodical manner which
reduces the likelihood of system failures. It is foreseeable that largescale or high-profile failures of aspects of this sanction could lead to
a significant loss of confidence in the concept, thereby jeopardizing
the adoption of the new sanction.
The first phase of implementing the monitoring sanction
would be testing all aspects of the technology. Once the integrity of
the system is validated at the testing phase, it should then be rolled
out for real offenders. Given the novelty of the proposal, there is no
blueprint for how to best implement technological supervision in
real-life settings. This is a matter on which lawmakers are likely to
have different views.
In our view, however, in light of the fact that sentencing
reform tends to evoke emotive responses from the community,
the implementation should carefully target specific categories of
offenders and the implementation should occur in a conservative
manner. After the technology has undergone the laboratory
testing phase,321 there should be a relatively short, say, twelve
month, trial of the new sanction on a small number, say one
hundred, very low risk offenders who have not committed
serious offenses.322 This should be conducted in relation to
offenders of whom the community has the least to fear and
whose offenses have caused the least amount of harm. Thus, the
sanction should be initially trialed in relation to offenders who
have committed fraud and other property offenses. Property
crimes cause the least amount of harm to victims,323 and
accordingly starting a trial with this offender cohort would be
particularly likely to garner community approval of the
321 The testing and development phase would also need to address the relatively
short (twelve hour) battery life of cameras. A twelve hour battery duration unduly limits
the activities of people. Presumably larger batteries could extend the operation of the
device to an acceptable level (in the order of one day), but this is a limitation that would
need to be overcome in the proof of concept phase.
322 This period is sufficiently long to provide an informed assessment of the
capabilities and limitations of the technology.
323 See supra Part III.
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monitoring sanction. The initial trial should also be confined to
offenders who already have a residence and whose co-residents
consent to the trial. This would ensure that the trial is conducted
in the most efficient and cost-effective manner.
After the initial field testing, a more extensive trial is
necessary. Ideally a large number of offenders should be subjected
to this process, given the strong present need to ameliorate
problems associated with probation and parole, and the need to
obtain as much data as possible regarding any possible
shortcomings associated with the technology and where necessary
to adjust or adapt the design of the sanction. In broad terms, we
suggest that this second part of the testing should involve
approximately ten thousand offenders and last for three years. In
absolute terms, this is a large number of people but in fact it
represents only about 0.2% of offenders currently undergoing
probation or parole.
Once the technology has been validated, the monitoring
sanction should be implemented more widely. The rate at which
the monitoring sanction is rolled out would depend largely on
the success of the second trial and what, if any, changes are
needed to the system. A key aspect of the trial would be the cost
associated with technology. There is likely to be a considerable
initial cost in adapting existing technology to create the sensors
that are necessary for the monitoring sanction. Once developed,
however, the cost is likely to be very small. The technology used
in driverless cars is considerably more complex and extensive
than that associated with the monitoring sanction, and it is
anticipated that the technology for self-driving cars will be in the
order of $7,000 to $10,000, reducing to approximately $3,000 as
more cars are rolled out.324 As noted above, the technology
underpinning driverless cars is complex and expensive because
of the enormous number of variables that must be accounted for
(e.g., road signs, other vehicles, pedestrian and traffic
conditions) and the very fast speed with which relevant events
occur, often exceeding more than sixty mph.
Given, the relative simplicity of the monitoring sanction, it
should be a fraction of the driverless car technology cost, and
certainly much less than the current costs of probation and parole.
It is not feasible to accurately determine the projected time it would
take for the monitoring sanction to replace the entire parole and
probation systems, however, as with most policy initiatives, it is
324 Chuck Tannert, Will You Ever Be Able to Afford a Self-driving Car?, FAST
COMPANY (Jan. 31, 2014), https://www.fastcompany.com/3025722/will-you-ever-be-ableto-afford-a-self-driving-car [https://perma.cc/AT2D-54CK].
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desirable to set in place a working time frame. To this end, we
suggest that a timeframe of approximately ten years should be set
for the full rollout of the new sanction.
CONCLUSION
The corrections population of the United States is at a
near record high. Nearly all of the focus in the literature and in
more recent times in the mainstream media has been on the high
prison numbers. The prison crisis is profound but so much so
that it has distracted lawmakers, courts and researchers from
another crisis in the corrections system. This article has sought
to highlight the considerable problems which exist with the
probation and parole system and provide a solution to address
the problems associated with these archaic sanctions.
More than four and a half million offenders are currently
on probation or parole. The probation and parole system is
broken. The system is chronically underfunded and does not allow
appropriate supervision of offenders. Despite this, the system is
still in objective terms prohibitively expensive—costing many
millions of dollars. The main failing of the system is that offenders
undergoing the sanction reoffend at alarming rates, causing a
large amount of damage to individuals and society in general.
There is little meaningful community dividend derived from the
probation and parole system.
There is a pressing need to reform these criminal sanctions.
The reforms should be based on the appropriate objectives of
sentencing. The main aims of sentencing are community protection
and rehabilitation. The most effective way to achieve these goals in
the context of sanctions which fall short of imprisonment are to
place offenders under constant surveillance regarding their
location and to also have the capacity to monitor the movements of
the offenders. Technological advances, which have been largely
ignored in the development of criminal sanctions, now provide the
means to fulfil these requirements.
The proposed monitoring sanction would involve the
integration and harmonization of several existing technologies.
Core to the sanction is the development and use of a sensor
system that monitors the location of offenders, detects suspicion
movements and triggers an alarm of the occurrence of such
events. The real splendor of this system is that offenders would
be aware that all of their actions are being monitored. This
would make them far less likely to commit criminal offenses. If
they were to do so, evidence of the crime would be available to
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police and prosecutors. This would greatly facilitate the criminal
detection and apprehension process.
The monitoring sanction is vastly superior to the current
outdated, clumsy, and ineffective parole and probation systems. In
an age where nearly all other areas of society and industry are
undergoing fundamental change, which is being driven by
technological developments it is no longer tenable that the criminal
justice system should stand apart from this shift. Lawmakers need
to embrace technological developments to ensure that the criminal
justice system better serves the needs of the community. The
monitoring sanction would greatly facilitate this process.

